The Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2024, alongside the proposed uniform civil code (UCC), underscores the Narendra Modi government’s broader plan to reshape the sociopolitical landscape, particularly that of the country’s Muslim community.

While the UCC has been a long-standing agenda of the Hindu Right, along with the Ram temple in Ayodhya and the abolition of Article 370, the Waqf (Amendment) Bill represents a more recent and potentially far-reaching intervention. Together, these legislative moves appear to be part of a concerted effort to realign the rights and identities of minority communities in accordance with a majoritarian vision.

History of waqf

The term waqf means “detention”, symbolising the inalienable nature of properties committed to charitable causes, a tradition that has endured for centuries and across continents. There was no concept of waqf before the advent of Islam in Arabia. Several companions of Prophet Muhammad dedicated lands and properties to charity, leading to the saying attributed to him: “Tie up the substance and give away the fruits” (habbis al-asl wa Sabbil al-tamarrat).

The earliest reference to waqf is linked to Umar, the second Caliph, at a place called Khaibar, with subsequent dedications of property ranging from palm gardens to fields and even camels. In India, a wide array of properties falls under waqf; they include mosques, idgahs, dargahs, khanqahs, imambaras, maqbaras, ashoorkhanas, qabristans (graveyards), and anjumans.

Following the First War of Independence in 1857, in which Muslims played a dominant role, the British colonial authorities sought to contain the community’s influence. Towards this end, they enacted the Land Resumption Act, which taxed waqf lands heavily, thus severely impacting Muslim welfare.

Also Read | Who really benefits from the Waqf Amendment Bill?

As Asaf A.A. Fyzee notes in his seminal work, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, there has been a consistent trend towards increased state control over waqf properties, both in Muslim-majority countries and in India. For instance, in 1924, the Turkish Republic dissolved the Ministry of Waqfs and placed its administration under general oversight. Similarly, Muhammad Ali in Egypt confiscated all agricultural waqfs and placed them under parliamentary control. In Russia’s Muslim districts, waqf properties endured for centuries until the October Revolution, after which the state seized them. In India, there have been various waqf-related pieces of legislation, beginning with the Waqf Act of 1913, where waqf was defined as a “permanent dedication by a person professing the Mussulman faith of any property for religious, pious, or charitable purposes recognised by Muslim law”.

Bill in contention

The Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2024, aims to amend the Waqf Act of 1995, which was last revised in 2013. The amendment proposes to rename it the Unified Waqf Management Empowerment Efficiency and Development Act, 1995. One key aspect of the 2013 amendment was the prohibition of the sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, or transfer of waqf property under Section 104A, with violators facing rigorous imprisonment.

The Modi government’s tendency to revisit and rework past legislation is well established, and the Waqf Act is no exception. Historically, waqf properties were not a major concern for the Hindu Right. However, interest surged following the Sachar Committee Report of 2006, which highlighted the under-utilisation of waqf properties and recommended reforms to enhance the role of such properties in uplifting the Muslim community. Many leaders of the Hindu Right were vocally critical of the Sachar report and labelled it an act of appeasement politics.

One of the more controversial proposals of the Waqf (Amendment) Bill is the inclusion of non-Muslim members in the management of waqf properties. This has sparked widespread concerns. During a parliamentary debate, at least 44 amendments were suggested by various political parties, and leaders from the INDIA bloc unanimously recommended that the Bill be referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC). The Modi government, now a coalition, had no option but to do so. The JPC has 31 members: 21 from the Lok Sabha and 10 from the Rajya Sabha. It is chaired by Jagdambika Pal, a BJP MP.

The JPC reportedly received millions of emails from concerned Muslims opposing the Bill. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board has said that more than five crore emails were sent to the JPC by concerned citizens.

Also Read | Editor’s Note: Putting Muslims in their place?

Some BJP members, such as Nishikant Dubey, even claimed that China and Pakistan were behind the mail campaign, while some Hindu Right politicians derogatorily referred to it as “email jehad”. Such accusations should be seen as part of the demonisation campaign against Muslims by the Hindu Right. (The present intervention is, in a broader sense, what this writer describes as the de-Islamisation of India in his 2024 book, Shikwa-e-Hind: The Political Future of Indian Muslims.)

Sachar committee report

According to the 2006 Sachar report, there are more than 4.9 lakh registered Waqfs in the country. There is a large concentration of Waqf properties in States such as West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka also have a significant number of Waqf properties (see the table above).

The total area under waqf properties across the country is estimated at 6 lakh acres, according to the report. A sizeable number of waqf properties in urban areas are located in city centres, and their market value is many times more than the book value. The urban locations are not surprising, given that the Muslim dynasties that governed the country largely operated from cities.

For instance, the report said, in Delhi alone the value of the Waqf properties is more than Rs. 6,000 crore. However, although these properties are of considerable size and value, the income generated is rather meagre. The Sachar report found that the current income then was only about Rs.163 crore, signifying a meagre rate of return of 2.7 per cent. Of this amount, it said, the Waqf Boards are entitled to receive a 7 per cent share, which is to be used for their working expenses.

The remaining amount is expected to be spent on the stated objectives of the respective waqfs. Therefore, issues such as mismanagement and under-utilisation are genuine, and reforms are required. During its review, the Sachar Committee also found that records of waqf properties were mostly outdated or incomplete. This discovery led to consultations with Waqf Board members and other stakeholders, resulting in several recommendations, including the need to reform the Waqf Act and ensure women’s representation on the boards.

Ironically, the Sachar Committee itself had no women members, highlighting broader issues of inclusivity. The Waqf (Amendment) Bill also has a provision for women members, which is clearly taken from the Sachar Committee recommendations.

Waqf properties: Encroachment, misuse and revenue loss

Encroachment of waqf properties by various private and government organisations has been a matter of grave concern across the country. In an interview to this author on September 27, Syed Mehmood Akhtar, who served as Director of Waqf between 2007 and 2011 under the Ministry of Minority Affairs during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, said that several prominent properties are built on encroached lands.

For instance, the ITC Windsor Manor in Bengaluru is built on leased waqf property. Likewise, other iconic properties on leased waqf land include the Tollygunge Club and the Royal Calcutta Golf Club in Kolkata, the latter being the oldest golf club in the country. None of these properties pay market rentals. Such lease arrangements across cities have been causing massive revenue losses for Waqf Boards in different States.

This is a key reason why amendments are necessary and why, without the active interventions of the state, well-entrenched violations cannot be addressed. The issue is further complicated by a long history of disputes and protracted legal battles with the government, private entities, and other organisations. For example, between 1911 and 1915, the colonial government acquired large tracts of land, including waqf properties, for the construction of the capital city of New Delhi.

Subsequent agreements with entities like the Sunni Majlis-e-Auqaf, which predated the Delhi Waqf Board, failed to resolve these disputes. In 1970, a significant number of these properties were officially recognised as waqf properties, yet over 300 legal suits were filed by various parties, including the Delhi Development Authority (DDA). Four high-powered committees were set up between 1974 and 1984 to examine the various disputes.

Waqf by use

The concept of “waqf by use”, which allows properties without formal records to be treated as waqf on the basis of their historical usage, is central to the administration of these properties. The current draft of the Waqf (Amendment) Bill, however, proposes to eliminate this concept, which could result in many such properties reverting to state control if no documentation exists to prove their waqf status. This issue led to a heated debate at a JPC meeting in August, reflecting the deep concerns within the Muslim community.

The draft Bill states: “Any government property identified or declared as Waqf property before or after the commencement of the Act shall not be recognised as Waqf property.”

The potential elimination of the “waqf by use” category could result in enormous losses for the Muslim community, particularly in major urban centres where such properties hold substantial economic and historical value, particularly dargahs, masjids, and qabristans.

Also Read | Why the proposed amendments to the law governing Waqf properties have triggered a fierce debate

As the Waqf (Amendment) Bill advances through the legislative channels, it is crucial to recognise that it represents more than just legal reform. It reflects the broader political dynamics at play in the country today—a manifestation of the ongoing struggle over the rights, identities, and future of the country’s many minority communities. The stakes are high, and the outcomes of this issue will resonate far beyond the confines of legal texts, potentially altering the fabric of our pluralistic society.

Speaking in Gurugram in September, Union Home Minister Amit Shah declared that the Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2024, would be passed in the upcoming winter session. But the government must approach the Bill with caution, balancing reforms with respect for the nation’s diverse historical and cultural foundations.

In an increasingly polarised atmosphere, the way forward must be rooted in justice, inclusivity, and the preservation of the country’s democratic ethos. The challenge, now more than ever, is to ensure that in pursuing national unity, we do not undermine the very pluralism that makes India unique.

Dr Mujibur Rehman is the author of Shikwa-e- Hind: The Political Future of Indian Muslims and teaches at Jamia Millia Central University, New Delhi.

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Member of Parliament Nishikant Dubey has stirred controversy with his ‘ISI and China link’ remarks about those who have sent suggestions to the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) on the Waqf (Amendment) Bill.

Dubey has been accused of trying to tarnish the image of Muslims in the name of people making suggestions to the JCP. A Muslim body – the All India Pasmanda Muslim Mahaz (AIPMM) has raised objections and written to the JPC seeking a probe against the BJP leader’s comments.

“There has been an attempt to tarnish the image of Muslims in the name of people making suggestions to the JCP. The conduct of the member must be probed. We understand Prime Minister Narendra Modi has set up the panel on the Waqf Bill with noble intentions to consider views from various sections,” AIPMM chief Ali Anwar Ansari was quoted as saying in a report by the Indian Express.

Ansari has also been a member of Rajya Sabha has shot off a letter to JPC chairperson and BJP leader Jagdambika Pal.

‘Zakir Naik or foreign powers like the ISI’

In August, Modi government faced opposition while it tried to pass the Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2024 in the Parliament. The government finally decided to form a JPC with as many as 21 members to scrutinise the proposed law. Dubey is also one of the members of JPC.

Dubey, in a letter to Pal, had in September sought an investigation by the Union home ministry into the origin of the feedback to the parliamentary panel, according to news agency PTI.

Dubey, a four-time MP, said the number of submissions was “unprecedented” and had set a global record for legislative submissions.

“Fundamentalist groups, individuals like Zakir Naik or foreign powers like the ISI (Pakistan) or China or their proxies may be involved given that 1.25 crore submissions have been received. If such forces are involved, it would be an attempt to manipulate our legislative process, an attack on the very foundations of our parliamentary system and must be treated as a national security issue,” Dubey, the Godda constituency in Jharkhand, had said last week.

We want to know on what grounds the member made such a statement.

The amended bill provides for a broad-based composition of the Central Waqf Council and the state Waqf boards and ensures the representation of Muslim women and non-Muslims in such bodies. The Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013 provided that “at least two of the members appointed under sub-clauses (i) to (viii) shall be women.”

“We saw a statement by a committee member (Dubey) that the JCP had received about 1.25 crore suggestions … There was a demand for an investigation of the origin of suggestions as some of them came from those suspected to have a ‘radical Islamic image and alleged links to the ISI’. We want to know on what grounds the member made such a statement,” read the October 3 letter, as per the Indian Express report.

Earlier, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), the apex body of Muslim clerics in India, had said the volume of response was on expected lines. The AIMPLB junked Dubey’s conspiracy claims, citing an earlier instance when 4.85 crore suggestions were sent to the government after its appeal, according to a report in India Today.

Rooted in Islamic tradition, waqf is a timeless institution that stands testament to the principles of community and social welfare. Derived from the Arabic term “waqafa”,” literally meaning to “tie up, bind or detain”, waqf refers to the consecration or dedication of property—movable or immovable—towards the approbation of the divine.

The key feature of this dedication is its perpetuity; the property once committed to waqf belongs to the divine, its benefits are meant to serve one’s family, community, institution, or any pious cause indefinitely. Technically, to any good cause or purpose that secures any benefit to human beings.

The concept of waqf has played an integral role across cultures and societies, particularly in India, where it has served as a tool for both religious and social welfare.

The recent proposals to amend certain sections of the Waqf Act raise significant concerns about the fundamental nature of waqf, its religious underpinnings, and the potential legal and social implications of such changes. There are three pivotal changes that are fundamental to the concept itself and, if allowed, will change the character and meaning of waqf as it is traditionally meant to be.

Islam as a precondition for creation of waqf

The proposed amendment to Section 3, Clause (r), introduces a significant change by specifying that only a person “practicing Islam for at least five years” may create a waqf from their movable or immovable property. This amendment replaces the previous phrasing, which simply allowed “any person” to establish a waqf. The new text seems to impose a stricter condition based on religious practice.

Also Read | Waqf Amendment Bill might dismantle centuries-old Islamic institutions in India

One major concern with this amendment is the introduction of a vague and unclear legal standard. The phrase “practicing Islam” is open to interpretation, especially in cases where individuals may follow Islamic principles without having formally converted to the religion, raising the question of what constitutes “practicing Islam” under the law.

Moreover, the amendment does not explicitly require the individual to be a Muslim, which creates confusion and ambiguity about who qualifies as eligible to create a waqf.

Introducing a requirement that the person must have practiced Islam for at least five years raises questions about the waqif’s (creator) religious competency and whether they meet the legal standard for establishing a waqf. The resulting confusion could lead to a rise in legal disputes, as courts may have to determine whether an individual qualifies as having “practiced Islam” sufficiently to create a valid waqf.

Perhaps most critically, the restriction based on religious practice contradicts the very essence of waqf as understood in Islamic tradition. Historically, waqf has never been restricted by the religious practice of the individual creating it. In fact, Islamic doctrine has long held that a waqf can be created by any individual, regardless of their religion, so long as the person creating the waqf is free, of full age, (i.e. an adult), and possessed of sound understanding (i.e. must be sane).

As a general rule all persons capable of making a valid gift are competent to constitute a valid waqf. Since the time of Prophet Muhammad, the creation of waqf has been seen as a matter of divine approbation, not necessarily tied to the creator’s religious identity.

This inclusive tradition is evident in Indian history, where non-Muslim rulers and citizens have contributed significantly to the waqf system by donating properties for mosques, idgahs, imambaras, and dargahs. Similarly, Muslim rulers in India have contributed to the construction of temples and other religious institutions for non-Muslim communities. The proposed amendment undermines this rich history of religious inclusivity.

Perpetuity of Waqf

One of the cornerstones of the waqf system is the concept of perpetuity. Once a waqf is established, the waqif relinquishes their proprietary rights over the property, which is then transferred to the Almighty in perpetuity.

In the case of waqf-alal-aulad, the waqif relinquishes ownership of the property and the rights to the property are irrevocably vested in the waqf. Once a waqf is created, neither the waqif nor their heirs retain any proprietary rights over the property, except for the right to enjoy its proceeds in accordance with the terms of the waqf.

Therefore, the property is no longer subject to inheritance, as it has already been dedicated to the waqf and Islamic law clearly states that a waqf-alal-aulad property is inalienable and non-inheritable.

Introducing inheritance rights into the framework of waqf-alal-aulad contradicts this fundamental principle and disrupts the perpetual nature of the waqf. It directly conflicts with the religious nature of waqf and its principles that prioritise the dedication of property to ultimately benevolent causes over personal or familial inheritance.

The proposed insertion of Section 3A states that the creation of a waqf-alal-aulad “shall not result in the denial of inheritance rights of heirs, including women heirs, of the waqif”. This proposed amendment undermines the religious sanctity of waqf and introduces legal ambiguity into a practice that has been clearly defined in Islamic law for centuries.

Since the creation of waqf-alal-aulad is considered a religious practice, any statutory interference that alters its fundamental nature may violate the constitutional right to religious freedom.

Giving in Islam

Within the context of Islam, supporting one’s family is seen as a charitable and pious act, particularly when wealth is dedicated for future generations through a waqf-alal-aulad. This type of waqf involves dedicating property for the benefit of one’s family and descendants, and once the family line is exhausted, the income is directed toward charitable purposes.

Also Read | Why the proposed amendments to the law governing Waqf properties have triggered a fierce debate

Under Islamic jurisprudence, the waqif is expected to devote the property’s proceeds first to their children and kindred, and then to charitable causes. This order of precedence is rooted in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, who advised that the income from a waqf should benefit one’s family first, and only when the line of succession is exhausted should it extend to other charitable purposes.

The proposed amendment to Section 3, Clause (r), Sub-Clause (iv), seeks to insert provisions specifically for the “maintenance of widow, divorced woman, and orphan” as part of the waqf-alal-aulad. This introduction of specific provisions for widows, divorced women, and orphans, though benevolent, conflicts with the established concept of waqf-alal-aulad as prescribed by Islamic law. The proposed amendment interferes with the religious rights of the waqif by altering the order of precedence for the use of waqf proceeds.

The prescribed order of precedence in waqf-alal-aulad is considered a religious duty, and any legislative interference that seeks to alter this framework may infringe upon the waqif’s religious right and risks infringing on the spiritual essence of waqf.

Impacts individuals’ constitutional rights

The proposed amendments to the Waqf Act raise significant concerns about the how they will impact the integrity of the waqf system, its religious underpinnings, and the constitutional rights of individuals. Any legislative changes to the waqf system must be carefully considered to ensure that they do not infringe on religious practices or violate the constitutional rights guaranteed to individuals. In a country like India, with its legacy of religious freedom and cultural diversity, where diversity and religious freedom are enshrined in the Constitution, it is essential to preserve the sanctity of waqf and protect its role as a tool for social welfare, charity, and devotion.

Rushda Khan is a lawyer practising in the Supreme Court.

Narendra Modi is not the kind of figure who will quietly sail into the sunset. On September 17, he turned 74, giving him one more year before the informal retirement age he himself set for members of the BJP. During the course of the Lok Sabha election earlier this year, it was passionately reiterated that Modi was exceptional (the leader himself suggested that he was perhaps even non-biological) and that, therefore, the retirement age did not apply to him.

The number, however, hangs in the air. The RSS, which had once pushed the same idea of voluntary retirement for the first generation of BJP leaders, particularly L.K. Advani, is not entirely enamoured of Modi these days and sarsanghchalak Mohan Bhagwat recently made one of his cryptic statements: “No one should consider themselves god….”

Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the first Prime Minister from the BJP, chose to fade away from active politics after the National Demoractic Alliance’s defeat in 2004, but Advani ignored the RSS and stubbornly stayed on. In 2013, the entire Sangh Parivar and the BJP rallied around Modi as the prime ministerial candidate and Advani’s primacy ended.

In those nine years, from 2004 to 2013, Advani was frequently mocked, critiqued, and ignored. Modi is still in power, but he has transited to leading a coalition government. While not as much as Advani, he too is indeed being slighted by the RSS chief occasionally and is increasingly critiqued by both insiders and the commentariat. Since June 4, the day the Lok Sabha election results were announced, Modi has not managed one of those staged moments when he would go on stage and people would watch riveted. If anything, audiences are bored, as illustrated by data that show a decline in viewership for his speeches on YouTube and in listener numbers for his Mann ki Baat.

Also Read | BJP is discovering that its prized defectors may be more liability than asset

Modi is fundamentally different from Advani: he has built a personality cult as opposed to building a movement and a party. Advani nurtured many next-generation figures in the BJP and actually propelled Vajpayee as the more acceptable face for a coalition. Modi has diminished all other power centres and built the I, me, myself aura that is proving difficult in a coalition era. That is showing in multiple ways: in having to send the Waqf (Amendment) Bill to a Joint Parliamentary Committee and in having to withdraw the Broadcast Services (Regulation) Bill and the proposal for lateral entry to the IAS.

The winds of change are being seen in the States as well. As the Centre’s pincer grip has loosened, the BJP has had to deal with divisions within its State units such as in Uttar Pradesh. The upcoming round of Assembly elections is yielding evidence that the BJP has transitioned to an era where the “Absolute Leader” is not so strong and local aspirations can come to the fore despite the Delhi writ. In Haryana, the announcement of candidates for the October 5 election triggered a string of resignations and protests. More chaos followed, this time in election-bound Jammu and Kashmir, where the BJP first announced and then rescinded a list of 44 candidates. In an odd way, these are all signs of health in a democracy. Equally, they illustrate that Modi is perhaps no longer the strongman he once was in the BJP.

The grandiose slogans of “Modi ki Guarantee” and “Modi Hai to Mumkin Hai” have been forgotten like the faded posters of the prime ministerial visage from the much-hyped G20 summit held in Delhi last year. Still, what the BJP and Modi do indeed have going for them is the loyalty of a section of the broadcast media. This helps them in narrative creation and gives them the capacity to defame opponents. The 2024 electoral setback for the BJP has not resulted in greater balance in news coverage, but in some instances at least, there is among anchors, many of whom rose in the age of Hindutva and are tethered to the regime, a greater anxiety to support Modi.

Television channels, therefore, focus on the protests after the rape and murder of a doctor in opposition-ruled West Bengal but will not spend any time on the violence and more serious civil war that has gone on for over a year now in BJP-ruled Manipur. Sections of the broadcast media will also ignore the poor safety record of the Railways in the Modi era but will bring focus on the Railways if a BJP-ruled State provides a narrative of deliberate sabotage by alleged Muslims and even coin the phrase “rail jehad”.

The “news” as disseminated by these channels is clearly designed to never focus on the ruling party’s failings and to hysterically magnify anything that may be a lapse or can be made to look like one by an opposition figure. Every word of Rahul Gandhi’s is picked upon, the AAP is irremediably bad, and the Trinamool Congress is currently enemy number one. These are currently the top hates of TV channels in the Hindi belt where the BJP is most rooted. The propaganda wing of the BJP is therefore still operating at full throttle in broadcast media and social media.

Also Read | Can the BJP recover in Uttar Pradesh?

The Modi regime in its third term may have compromised on issues such as the Broadcast Bill and might occasionally reach out to the opposition. But there is one issue on which it will not budge: any questioning or examination of the Adani Group, whose rise in fortune has paralleled Modi’s national ascendance. The chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Madhabi Buch, has been mired in controversies that raise serious conflict of interest concerns and even suggest outright corruption, charges that need to be investigated. Yet, asking the SEBI chief to resign is apparently out of the question. SEBI was tasked with examining Gautam Adani’s extraordinary growth in the Modi era by means that would be deemed questionable in other countries, and it found no wrongdoing. The SEBI chief reports to the Finance Minister, who in turn reports to the Prime Minister.

Many years ago, when he was Chief Minister, this columnist was one of the journalists who surrounded Modi during a national executive meet of the BJP. When he was asked some questions, he responded by saying in one instance that “some people now say that Modi creates the clouds and the cloudburst”. The “non-biological” theme therefore was not born in 2024. In 2024, it can be said that as far as the Prime Minister is concerned, there is an ill wind blowing and the monsoon has unleashed a downpour. The new Parliament building and the Ram Mandir at Ayodhya, both mega projects associated with Modi, have seen embarrassing water leakage and seepage issues. Worse, a giant statue of Chhatrapati Shivaji inaugurated by him nine months ago in Sindhudurg district of Maharashtra collapsed, forcing even the strongman to apologise, obviously in the light of the upcoming election. Sure, the ruling BJP coalition is comfortable in terms of the arithmetic, but the chemistry around the Prime Minister has changed. 

Saba Naqvi is a Delhi-based journalist and author of four books who writes on politics and identity issues.

Trouble from allies seems to be mounting for the BJP, especially from its partners in Bihar, where the Assembly election is due next year. While K.C. Tyagi of the Janata Dal (United) or JD(U) suddenly resigned from the key role of party chief spokesperson on September 1, days after he made statements distancing the JD(U) from the BJP’s key decisions, including lateral entry into services and the Uniform Civil Code, LJP (Ram Vilas) chief and Union Minister Chirag Paswan, who had also issued statements opposing the Centre’s proposals, adopted a reconciliatory tone following a meeting with Home Minister Amit Shah after it appeared that the BJP might reopen channels of communication with his estranged uncle, Pashupati Kumar Paras.

Paswan, who proudly claimed himself to be the “Hanuman” of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, had openly expressed his opinion against a number of decisions of the Modi government in the last two months. In August, when a notification came for lateral entry recruitment of 45 joint secretaries, directors, and deputy secretaries, Paswan said that this was “completely wrong” and that his party was “absolutely not in favour” of it. Paswan, whose party has been pitching for quotas even in the private sector, wants the government to adhere to reservations whenever it issues notifications for jobs. His statement echoes the opposition’s claim that the government’s move undermines the rights of Other Backward Classes (OBCs), Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). The government later withdrew the notification.

Also Read | ‘NDA is stronger in Bihar now’: Chirag Paswan

Paswan is also batting for a caste census, a demand being aggressively pushed by the Congress and other opposition parties. Equally vocal was his protest against the Waqf Amendment Bill brought in by the government in the monsoon session. In the midst of all this, Paswan’s uncle Pashupati Kumar Paras, who was in the political wilderness ever since the BJP chose to dump him in favour of Paswan before the 2024 election, suddenly met with Amit Shah. There are indications that Paras could get a key position now. He was a Union Minister in the previous Modi government after forming his own party, walking away with all LJP MPs barring Paswan, in 2021.

In 2024, the tables turned and Paras was not given a single Lok Sabha seat to contest from Bihar even as his party remained part of the NDA, while Paswan’s faction contested five seats and won all. However, after becoming Minister of Food Processing Industries, Paswan has tried to maintain the distinct identity of LJP, which in the past allied with socialist parties and Congress.

Paswan’s recent assertions have not gone down well within the BJP. Political experts view Paras’ meeting with Shah and his assertion that he will contest the Bihar Assembly election as part of NDA, as the BJP’s pressure tactic to rein in Paswan. Also, there was a recent development that raised eyebrows. A BJP leader in Bihar filed a complaint challenging Paswan’s Lok Sabha election from Hajipur alleging that he suppressed details about a criminal case.

On August 30, TMC MP Mahua Moitra posted on microblogging site X: “SOP of BJP. The minute any “ally” shows a spine, wants caste census, speaks up against WAKF amendment- get cases filed, break party, put pressure & get them to shut up.” She advised Paswan to “stand strong”.

The Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) alleged that the BJP could have poached three LJP MPs, a contention officially denied by LJP, which at the same time did not mince words in criticising Paras and his meeting with Shah. Paswan, on his part, met Shah and expressed confidence that the relationship between him and the BJP was unbreakable. He shared photos of his meeting with Shah on social media and told media persons that there was no possibility of any divide within the party. (It was Paswan who had pushed his father, Ram Vilas Paswan, to join hands with the BJP in February 2014 ahead of the Lok Sabha election after a gap of 12 years.)

The sudden resignation of Tyagi, JDU’s media face in Delhi, was baffling to journalists and politicians of UP and Bihar. Even as the media tried to decipher it, conflicting versions emerged, from Tyagi having been fired for taking on the BJP strongly on many issues to Nitish Kumar keeping him from national media handling ahead of a possible realignment of political forces in Bihar.

Days after Tyagi’s resignation, Bihar’s Leader of the Opposition Tejashwi Yadav met Chief Minister Nitish Kumar at the Secretariat in Patna on September 4, fuelling speculation of another reshuffle in Bihar politics. However, Nitish Kumar quickly sought to establish that he will not change sides any more and said that joining hands with RJD twice in the past was a mistake. On August 9, Tejashwi Yadav also ruled out any future alliance with Nitish Kumar.

Ajay Gudavarthy, associate professor at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, told Frontline: “The relation between the BJP and the allies in Modi 3.0 are not set in stone. The allies are not necessarily looking to pull down the government when they are active partners in the government. How the alliance plays out, therefore, depends more on the opposition INDIA bloc and its ability to set a counter-narrative in place.” He added: “The real crisis is Modi 3.0 has lost its ability to set the narrative as it has no substantive agenda. It has lost its optics of unifying the Hindus, without which Modi cannot be in the driver’s seat. Will this lead to weak governance or strong allies is something we need to keep a watch on.”

Managing allies has always been a tough task for ruling parties at the Centre. The first and second Modi-led governments did not face this problem as the BJP had an absolute majority on its own. However, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee had to face tantrums from allies such as Jayalalithaa, Mamata Banerjee, and Mayawati. In the first and second United Progressive Alliance (UPA) governments, headed by Manmohan Singh, pressure from allies was a recurring problem.

The third Modi government, although dependent on allies, is more comfortably placed in comparison to the UPA governments as it is not far off from the majority mark with 240 seats. Its allies have 53 seats in total. For a simple majority, it requires the support of 272 members in the 543-member House. The NDA’s key allies, the Telugu Desam Party, the JD(U), Shiv Sena (Shinde), and the LJP respectively have 16, 12, 7, and 5 members.

In the last two terms, the Modi government had dealt with allies firmly, not acceding to the demand for setting up an NDA Coordination Committee or appointing a convenor for alliance. In fact, Shiv Sena had made the demand for an NDA coordination panel way back in 2015 during the first Modi government. During Modi’s second tenure, even other allies such as the JD(U), LJP, and Apna Dal had demanded a panel to create consensus in decision-making, but it was conveniently ignored.

Also Read | ‘People in Bihar do not want MY, they want A to Z’: K.C. Tyagi

After the BJP passed three contentious farm laws in 2020, its key ally Shiromani Akali Dal even broke away from the alliance after the saffron party refused to heed its demand to rescind them. Contrast this with the agility with which the BJP withdrew or agreed to revisit its contentious decisions this time: it cancelled the advertisement for lateral entry appointments, it withdrew the second draft of the Broadcast Bill and extended to October 15 the date for public feedback on the original Bill, it referred the Waqf Board Bill to a JPC for scrutiny, and restored indexation benefit on long-term capital gains.

Some pragmatism

When needed the BJP has shown the pragmatism to stoop to conquer, such as accepting Nitish Kumar as Chief Minister in the alliance government in Bihar despite having a greater number of seats in the Assembly than the JD(U) in 2010 and then in 2020. The BJP clearly realises that it does not have enough heft in Bihar to come to power on its own. Nitish Kumar first the left NDA in 2013, breaking 17-year-long ties with the BJP, and then rejoined it in 2017; he left again in 2022 and rejoined the NDA in 2023. The JD (U), which had won only two of 40 seats in the Lok Sabha in 2014, had forced the BJP to let it contest in 16 seats in 2024. It was a winning combination and the NDA romped home.

The BJP has lost allies in the past. In September 2020, it parted ways with the Shiromani Akali Dal. In September 2023, it lost the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu, although it gained the Janata Dal (Secular) as an ally in Karnataka. It remains to be seen how the Modi-Shah duo will manage a full five years depending on allies like Nitish Kumar, Chirag Paswan, and N. Chandrababu Naidu of the Telugu Desam Party. All of these leaders have worked with parties across the political spectrum and are known to seek the best deal for themselves.

In recent weeks, the NDA government has selectively rolled back a few decisions, the most crucial one being the proposal to induct officers at the level of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Director through a “lateral entry” system. Other climbdowns include the withdrawal of the Draft Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill and the referral of the Waqf (Amendment) Bill to a joint parliamentary committee. These instances have led to the belief that the government has paid heed to the counsel of its coalition partners and the opposition, but the U-turn on lateral entry appointments indicates that this could be a misplaced perception.

The Annual Report (2022-23) of the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) states that “lateral recruitment is an initiative of the government to achieve the twin objective of bringing in fresh talent as well as augmenting the availability of manpower at middle management levels by appointing persons, at the level of Joint Secretary, Director and Deputy Secretary, for specific assignments keeping in view their specialised knowledge and expertise in their domain area. A total of 36 officers comprising 09 Joint Secretaries, 18 Directors and 09 Deputy Secretaries, appointed through Lateral Recruitment, are in position in various Ministries/ Departments. The list includes 30 officers who were selected during 2021, comprising three Joint Secretaries, eighteen Directors and nine Deputy Secretaries.”

On August 17, the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) issued a notification, for the second time in less than three months, inviting online applications for lateral recruitment to 45 posts in the three Group A categories of Central government jobs. The contract or deputation was for three to five years, and the deadline for submission was September 17. Candidates needed to have 15 years of work experience for the post of Joint Secretary, and 10 years and 7 years for the Director and Deputy Secretary posts, respectively. Those eligible to apply were officers of States/Union Territories working at equivalent levels and with the requisite experience and individuals in comparable levels in public sector undertakings, autonomous bodies, statutory organisations, universities, recognised research institutes, private sector companies, consultancy organisations, and international and multinational organisations. The advertisement did not provide for any reserved category posts.

Also Read | ‘We instil confidence in the aspirants’: Ved Prakash Gupta

The UPSC issued a similar notification in June for 17 posts in the Group A category. All were for recruitment of candidates belonging to the category of people with “Benchmark Disability”.

Although the government had inducted officers through a similar process in 2018, this was the first time the UPSC was notifying the positions and not the DoPT.

On the back foot

The government appeared to be on the back foot as opposition parties and the ruling party’s own allies, especially the Janata Dal (United) and the Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas), objected to it on the grounds that it militated against the principles of social justice.

Within four days of the notification, a letter from the office of Jitendra Singh, Minister of State, DoPT, was sent to UPSC chairperson Preeti Sudan asking her to cancel the advertisement. Before taking over as UPSC chairperson in July following the abrupt resignation of Manoj Soni, Sudan had officiated as Secretary, Health, and held other important portfolios.

Apart from implying that the UPSC had acted on its own, Singh’s letter went on to extol the Prime Minister’s deep resolve to adhere to the principles of equity and social justice. The process of “lateral entry must be aligned” to those principles, especially the provisions concerning reservation, the Minister’s letter said.

Obviously, the BJP could not afford to be seen as “anti-reservation” with elections to three State Assemblies and one Union Territory around the corner. The UPSC chairperson was just the fall guy. The letter reminded the UPSC chairperson that “reservation in public employment is a cornerstone of our social justice framework, aimed at addressing historical injustices and promoting inclusivity” and “it is important that the constitutional mandate towards social justice is upheld so that the deserving candidates from marginalised communities get their rightful representation in the government services”. The letter further reasoned that as these were single-cadre posts, there was no provision for reservation in these appointments, adding that “this aspect needs to be reviewed and reformed in the context of the Hon’ble Prime Minister’s focus on ensuring social justice”.

In a veiled attack on the Congress, the letter mentioned that lateral entry was endorsed by the Second Administrative Reforms Commission constituted in 2005 and chaired by Veerappa Moily, implying that the NDA government was only carrying on something the previous government had initiated. The Sixth Pay Commission (2013) had also recommended the same, the letter pointed out, stating that “both before and after, there have been many high-profile cases of lateral entrants”. What the letter failed to mention, however, was that these high-profile cases were of people with distinguished careers in their fields who were appointed as secretaries or advisers to the government.

What senior bureaucrats say

A few senior bureaucrats Frontline spoke to were of the unanimous opinion that lateral entry at the levels of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or Director would make no value addition at all.

According to the retired bureaucrat E.A.S. Sarma, successive governments adopted the lateral entry route to bypass reservation on the premise that it ran counter to the idea of “merit” and “expertise”. Other devious ways adopted, he told Frontline, include contract employment, outsourcing, public-private partnerships, and privatisation of Central Public Sector Enterprises. “Since 1991, in the guise of ‘reform’, successive governments have progressively shrunk the size of the public sector to circumvent reservation,” he said.

Sarma said that providing SC, ST, and OBC reservation was a constitutional obligation that both the United Progressive Alliance and NDA governments had violated. He explained that the role of a Joint Secretary in a ministry was different from the role of an “expert” recruited from outside. A person in that position was expected to ensure that a proposal processed in a ministry was consistent with the relevant laws, aligned with the government’s formally adopted policies for that sector, and upheld the values of the Constitution—tasks for which a specialist may not be particularly suitable. He added that lateral entry could be justified for certain key roles, such as Chief Economic Adviser, or advisers in ministries related to mining, petroleum, and chemicals, and in the NITI Aayog and other think tanks. Any first entry, he said, should be subject to reservation.

“Contextually, the recent moves on the part of the government to nominate civil services to function as rath prabharis [incharge] before elections to promote a personality cult, lifting the six-decade ban on civil servants joining the RSS and loading important public institutions with persons selected on the basis of their ideological bias, have rendered the move to recruit Joint Secretary-level officers laterally particularly dubious. I am glad the government dropped the proposal under pressure,” Sarma said.

M.G. Devasahayam, another retired civil servant and a former Army officer, said that the Indian Administrative Services was created with “the idea that the best talent, best brains must come up to hold the country together through a common interest. The IAS has no central cadre. Its officers are recruited and trained by the government of India and are sent to the States. They bring together the experiences of the entire country. They are expected to reflect the pulse of the country.” He cited how he, although belonging to Tamil Nadu, served as an officer in the Haryana cadre.

According to him, lateral entry was not always undesirable. He pointed to V. Krishnamurthy, former CEO of BHEL, SAIL, Maruti Udyog Ltd, and GAIL; the agricultural scientist M.S. Swaminathan; the technocrat R.V. Shahi; and the economists Montek Singh Ahluwalia and Manmohan Singh, all of whom joined at senior levels.

The trouble, said Devasahayam, started in 2018, when the DoPT put out an advertisement to recruit 10 Joint Secretaries and a few Deputy Secretaries. Despite opposition, the recruitment took place. In 2019, the DoPT began recruiting 450 officers at the levels of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Director; this was close to 60 per cent of the strength of the Central government personnel at that level. Despite opposition from within and outside, some 63 people were inducted. “Now they want to bring in 45 more. This has reduced direct recruitment from the IAS,” he said.

According to Devasahayam, if specialists are required they can be recruited from within the cadre. There are highly technical people in the IAS with specialisations. Any person in the corporate sector with similar years of experience might not know enough about governance, he said. There was a worry that private sector people inducted through lateral recruitment would initiate policies favourable to certain corporate entities. The second danger, Devasahayam said, was the induction of a large number of people from the RSS, more so after the ban had been lifted on government servants joining the organisation.

While there is no harm in bringing specialists, there are brilliant IIT and IIM graduates in the IAS, and the government could create a special cadre from within. “Have specialisations but do not dilute,” he said. “How can one expect a person coming from the corporate sector to coordinate with the States? There is no gain in this kind of lateral entry.”

According to Devasahayam, lateral entry at a certain level is fine, but it cannot be a regular recruitment process. “Is it so difficult for the government to find a few persons from the reserved categories? It will find a few names aligned to its ideology and may not even fill the posts as is the case already with the Central government. The opposition parties have not seen through the game. The advertisement will be issued again; this time with provisions for reservation. But the posts will remain vacant,” he said.

Officers on deputation

The other issue is to get commitment from such lateral appointees. An officer on deputation or contract might not have a stake in the job; three years is too short a time. “I think the idea is to recruit their favourite corporate people and those who missed the bus for the IAS,” said Devasahayam. “They will be ‘conferred IAS’ just as State service officers are done. Only 60 per cent are direct recruits in the IAS; others are ‘conferred IAS’. Those recruited from the pool of State Administrative Officers and State Public Service Commissions are ‘conferred IAS’. Lateral entry will be for those who can’t come in through the front door.”

Also Read | The 3G teacher of Namo Jamdoba

K. Sujatha Rao, former Union Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, agreed. “The government should have proposed lateral entry at very senior policy levels, the way Manmohan Singh or Montek Singh Ahluwalia were inducted. But such eminent people have to be invited, not recruited through the UPSC.” Rao added that to make up for shortage of personnel, the government should increase the intake at the UPSC entrance level and, in the short run, use contractual appointments, which is already being done.

Rao was sceptical about the government gaining anything. “Someone from the private sector will get a complete inside view of policymaking and make good contacts; their market value will be high when they leave. I doubt whether the government can gain much. It’s a different matter if it’s a permanent recruitment. No harm in providing for reservation, but why such recruitments are being made in the first place needs to be clarified,” she said.

Whether the U-turn on lateral appointments is really a climbdown for the government is doubtful.

The government has made it clear that it will institutionalise lateral entry through the UPSC and provide for reservation against lateral entry posts in Group A posts.

The opposition parties may actually have made it easier for the government to do exactly what it wants. Not only has the number of jobs in the Central government shrunk (see tables), there are fewer people from reserved categories in Group A and B jobs, and there is a disproportionate representation of them in Groups C and D. In all likelihood, the posts will be left vacant citing the “non-availability” of reserved category candidates.

WATCH | Vikhar Ahmed Sayeed in conversation with former Union Minister of Minority Affairs K. Rahman Khan

The veteran politician argues that the new Bill is a thinly veiled attempt to wrest control of Muslim religious endowments.
| Video Credit:
Interview by Vikhar Ahmed Sayeed; Camera: Rabi Debnath; Editing by Samson Ronald K.; Produced by: Jinoy Jose P. 

A former Union Minister of Minority Affairs, K. Rahman Khan’s political career spans more than five decades, starting in Karnataka before moving to the national arena. He became a member of the Rajya Sabha in the 1990s, serving four consecutive terms. During this time, he headed two joint parliamentary committees, leading to the amendment of the Waqf Act of 1995. He also served as the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.

In this interview with Frontline, Khan launches a scathing critique of proposed amendments to the Waqf Act, accusing the Modi government of attempting to undermine Muslim control over vast Waqf properties across India. The veteran politician argues that the new Bill, far from improving transparency and accountability as claimed, is a thinly veiled attempt to wrest control of Muslim religious endowments.