The Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2024, alongside the proposed uniform civil code (UCC), underscores the Narendra Modi government’s broader plan to reshape the sociopolitical landscape, particularly that of the country’s Muslim community.

While the UCC has been a long-standing agenda of the Hindu Right, along with the Ram temple in Ayodhya and the abolition of Article 370, the Waqf (Amendment) Bill represents a more recent and potentially far-reaching intervention. Together, these legislative moves appear to be part of a concerted effort to realign the rights and identities of minority communities in accordance with a majoritarian vision.

History of waqf

The term waqf means “detention”, symbolising the inalienable nature of properties committed to charitable causes, a tradition that has endured for centuries and across continents. There was no concept of waqf before the advent of Islam in Arabia. Several companions of Prophet Muhammad dedicated lands and properties to charity, leading to the saying attributed to him: “Tie up the substance and give away the fruits” (habbis al-asl wa Sabbil al-tamarrat).

The earliest reference to waqf is linked to Umar, the second Caliph, at a place called Khaibar, with subsequent dedications of property ranging from palm gardens to fields and even camels. In India, a wide array of properties falls under waqf; they include mosques, idgahs, dargahs, khanqahs, imambaras, maqbaras, ashoorkhanas, qabristans (graveyards), and anjumans.

Following the First War of Independence in 1857, in which Muslims played a dominant role, the British colonial authorities sought to contain the community’s influence. Towards this end, they enacted the Land Resumption Act, which taxed waqf lands heavily, thus severely impacting Muslim welfare.

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As Asaf A.A. Fyzee notes in his seminal work, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, there has been a consistent trend towards increased state control over waqf properties, both in Muslim-majority countries and in India. For instance, in 1924, the Turkish Republic dissolved the Ministry of Waqfs and placed its administration under general oversight. Similarly, Muhammad Ali in Egypt confiscated all agricultural waqfs and placed them under parliamentary control. In Russia’s Muslim districts, waqf properties endured for centuries until the October Revolution, after which the state seized them. In India, there have been various waqf-related pieces of legislation, beginning with the Waqf Act of 1913, where waqf was defined as a “permanent dedication by a person professing the Mussulman faith of any property for religious, pious, or charitable purposes recognised by Muslim law”.

Bill in contention

The Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2024, aims to amend the Waqf Act of 1995, which was last revised in 2013. The amendment proposes to rename it the Unified Waqf Management Empowerment Efficiency and Development Act, 1995. One key aspect of the 2013 amendment was the prohibition of the sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, or transfer of waqf property under Section 104A, with violators facing rigorous imprisonment.

The Modi government’s tendency to revisit and rework past legislation is well established, and the Waqf Act is no exception. Historically, waqf properties were not a major concern for the Hindu Right. However, interest surged following the Sachar Committee Report of 2006, which highlighted the under-utilisation of waqf properties and recommended reforms to enhance the role of such properties in uplifting the Muslim community. Many leaders of the Hindu Right were vocally critical of the Sachar report and labelled it an act of appeasement politics.

One of the more controversial proposals of the Waqf (Amendment) Bill is the inclusion of non-Muslim members in the management of waqf properties. This has sparked widespread concerns. During a parliamentary debate, at least 44 amendments were suggested by various political parties, and leaders from the INDIA bloc unanimously recommended that the Bill be referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC). The Modi government, now a coalition, had no option but to do so. The JPC has 31 members: 21 from the Lok Sabha and 10 from the Rajya Sabha. It is chaired by Jagdambika Pal, a BJP MP.

The JPC reportedly received millions of emails from concerned Muslims opposing the Bill. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board has said that more than five crore emails were sent to the JPC by concerned citizens.

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Some BJP members, such as Nishikant Dubey, even claimed that China and Pakistan were behind the mail campaign, while some Hindu Right politicians derogatorily referred to it as “email jehad”. Such accusations should be seen as part of the demonisation campaign against Muslims by the Hindu Right. (The present intervention is, in a broader sense, what this writer describes as the de-Islamisation of India in his 2024 book, Shikwa-e-Hind: The Political Future of Indian Muslims.)

Sachar committee report

According to the 2006 Sachar report, there are more than 4.9 lakh registered Waqfs in the country. There is a large concentration of Waqf properties in States such as West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka also have a significant number of Waqf properties (see the table above).

The total area under waqf properties across the country is estimated at 6 lakh acres, according to the report. A sizeable number of waqf properties in urban areas are located in city centres, and their market value is many times more than the book value. The urban locations are not surprising, given that the Muslim dynasties that governed the country largely operated from cities.

For instance, the report said, in Delhi alone the value of the Waqf properties is more than Rs. 6,000 crore. However, although these properties are of considerable size and value, the income generated is rather meagre. The Sachar report found that the current income then was only about Rs.163 crore, signifying a meagre rate of return of 2.7 per cent. Of this amount, it said, the Waqf Boards are entitled to receive a 7 per cent share, which is to be used for their working expenses.

The remaining amount is expected to be spent on the stated objectives of the respective waqfs. Therefore, issues such as mismanagement and under-utilisation are genuine, and reforms are required. During its review, the Sachar Committee also found that records of waqf properties were mostly outdated or incomplete. This discovery led to consultations with Waqf Board members and other stakeholders, resulting in several recommendations, including the need to reform the Waqf Act and ensure women’s representation on the boards.

Ironically, the Sachar Committee itself had no women members, highlighting broader issues of inclusivity. The Waqf (Amendment) Bill also has a provision for women members, which is clearly taken from the Sachar Committee recommendations.

Waqf properties: Encroachment, misuse and revenue loss

Encroachment of waqf properties by various private and government organisations has been a matter of grave concern across the country. In an interview to this author on September 27, Syed Mehmood Akhtar, who served as Director of Waqf between 2007 and 2011 under the Ministry of Minority Affairs during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, said that several prominent properties are built on encroached lands.

For instance, the ITC Windsor Manor in Bengaluru is built on leased waqf property. Likewise, other iconic properties on leased waqf land include the Tollygunge Club and the Royal Calcutta Golf Club in Kolkata, the latter being the oldest golf club in the country. None of these properties pay market rentals. Such lease arrangements across cities have been causing massive revenue losses for Waqf Boards in different States.

This is a key reason why amendments are necessary and why, without the active interventions of the state, well-entrenched violations cannot be addressed. The issue is further complicated by a long history of disputes and protracted legal battles with the government, private entities, and other organisations. For example, between 1911 and 1915, the colonial government acquired large tracts of land, including waqf properties, for the construction of the capital city of New Delhi.

Subsequent agreements with entities like the Sunni Majlis-e-Auqaf, which predated the Delhi Waqf Board, failed to resolve these disputes. In 1970, a significant number of these properties were officially recognised as waqf properties, yet over 300 legal suits were filed by various parties, including the Delhi Development Authority (DDA). Four high-powered committees were set up between 1974 and 1984 to examine the various disputes.

Waqf by use

The concept of “waqf by use”, which allows properties without formal records to be treated as waqf on the basis of their historical usage, is central to the administration of these properties. The current draft of the Waqf (Amendment) Bill, however, proposes to eliminate this concept, which could result in many such properties reverting to state control if no documentation exists to prove their waqf status. This issue led to a heated debate at a JPC meeting in August, reflecting the deep concerns within the Muslim community.

The draft Bill states: “Any government property identified or declared as Waqf property before or after the commencement of the Act shall not be recognised as Waqf property.”

The potential elimination of the “waqf by use” category could result in enormous losses for the Muslim community, particularly in major urban centres where such properties hold substantial economic and historical value, particularly dargahs, masjids, and qabristans.

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As the Waqf (Amendment) Bill advances through the legislative channels, it is crucial to recognise that it represents more than just legal reform. It reflects the broader political dynamics at play in the country today—a manifestation of the ongoing struggle over the rights, identities, and future of the country’s many minority communities. The stakes are high, and the outcomes of this issue will resonate far beyond the confines of legal texts, potentially altering the fabric of our pluralistic society.

Speaking in Gurugram in September, Union Home Minister Amit Shah declared that the Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2024, would be passed in the upcoming winter session. But the government must approach the Bill with caution, balancing reforms with respect for the nation’s diverse historical and cultural foundations.

In an increasingly polarised atmosphere, the way forward must be rooted in justice, inclusivity, and the preservation of the country’s democratic ethos. The challenge, now more than ever, is to ensure that in pursuing national unity, we do not undermine the very pluralism that makes India unique.

Dr Mujibur Rehman is the author of Shikwa-e- Hind: The Political Future of Indian Muslims and teaches at Jamia Millia Central University, New Delhi.

The tendency for key moments in a nation’s past to be invoked or revisited in times of crisis or when great change is in the air was famously explored by Karl Marx in his tract “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”, published in 1852. Writing in the immediate aftermath of the coup d’état staged by Louis Bonaparte, nephew of the more famous Napoleon, in December 1851, Marx was struck by the parallels—and dissonances—between this event and Napoleon’s own seizure of power half a century earlier.

In both instances, an upstart with imperial ambitions had been able to stamp down on emergent new forces, to annihilate the promise of revolutionary change, to turn back the clock of history. But whereas the earlier putsch, staged in 1799 on the 18th day of Brumaire, the second month of the republican calendar introduced under the French Revolution, had all the hallmarks of a seismic rupture and betrayal—a political tragedy of the first order— the same could not be said of its subsequent replay. Marx found a particularly mordant way of expressing what struck him as a grotesque contrast between events past and present. “Hegel remarks somewhere,” he wrote, “that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.” 

Now French President Emmanuel Macron has come up with his own iteration of the Napoleonic putsch. On September 5, he ended the two-month political interregnum created by his refusal to honour the results of this summer’s legislative elections by installing Michel Barnier, a superannuated right-wing politician, as the nation’s new Prime Minister. By this act, Macron in effect declared null and void the results of elections he himself had called; he gave the nation—and the democratic process—the finger.

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It is hard to get one’s head round the implications of Macron’s “coup de force”, the favoured term on the left for his executive fiat. By any reckoning, this is terra nova for France, shaky ground without precedent in recent history. Until now, French presidents have complied with the informal understanding that the party or bloc that emerges victorious from Parliamentary elections should be invited to form a government, headed by a prime minister of their own choosing.

Several times in the past, this has resulted in uneasy “cohabitations” between presidents and governments of different political stripes. Between 1997 and 2002, to cite the most recent instance, Jacques Chirac, a right-wing President, was obliged to bed down with a government of the left headed by Lionel Jospin, the then leader of the Socialist Party. In that instance, Chirac’s options were limited by the fact that a united left had emerged from legislative election with an absolute majority. Even so, a tacit protocol seemed to be in place: one that attached importance to acknowledging election outcomes and observing the rules of the game.

Over the course of the past three months, Macron has been studiously shredding the rule book, adhering instead to a script of his own imagining and epic self-belief. The result has been a summer of political vaudeville, a theatre of the grotesque, a drôle de guerre (phony war) shadowed by the menace of dark times ahead. From tragedy to farce; from farce to burlesque.

The curtain-raiser

The premier force on France’s neo-fascist far right, the Rassemblement National (RN), led by Marine Le Pen, emerges the victor of the French election to the European Parliament, held in early June. RN wins 31.4 per cent of the vote, lobbing Macron’s own “centrist” formation, Réveiller Europe, into humiliating third place, with a vote share of just 13.8 per cent. In an apparent fit of pique (although RN’s victory has been amply predicted by the polls) Macron dissolves the National Assembly (the lower house of Parliament) and calls snap elections. He wagers that, as in the past, the French electorate will rally around his leadership of a “republican front” against fascism, enabling him to push back against Le Pen, shore up his authoritarian neoliberal agenda and safely live out the remnants of his second presidential term.

Act 1: The gamble unravels

Macron’s wager pivots on the assumption that the notoriously fractious French left will be unable to get its act together. Instead, the country’s four leading left-wing forces swiftly form a New Popular Front to attack the fascist threat from the left. To the dismay of Macron and the wider French establishment, the new alliance surmounts every anticipated obstacle, from agreement on a common programme to seat distribution. In the first round of voting, on June 30, the New Popular Front takes second place, with 28 per cent of the vote (against the RN’s 33 per cent). Macron finds himself relegated to the status of an also-ran.

Act 2: Doomsday—and Denial

The knell tolls for Macron’s Big Gamble just after 10 pm on July 7: the day of second-round voting. As the first exit polls are announced, Macron’s humiliation is complete: against all poll and media predictions, the New Popular Front, emerging with the biggest block of national Assembly seats, is the force that has beaten back the neo-fascist threat. The French President now enters a state of denialism: the term psychologists apply to those who refuse to accept an empirically verifiable fact or reality. No one has won the election, he declares. Everything must continue as before. With me in charge, naturally. This is the situation when, on July 23, the New Popular Front names Lucie Castets, a left-leaning former civil servant, as its candidate for the premiership. Young, personable, competent and progressive, Castets seems suited in every way to the challenges of the moment. How will Macron respond?

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The Intermission: Time for games, Olympic and otherwise

Providentially, up pops a pretext for further prevarication: the 2024 Summer Olympic Games, about to open in Paris. Declaring an “Olympic truce” for the duration of the spectacle, Macron invokes “stability”. “It’s clear”, he says, “that until mid-August we’re not in a position to change things because we’d create disorder.” Installing a caretaker government, he now contrives to transform the Olympics into a showcase not simply for France’s captivating capital city but also for its head of state. No photo opportunity is lost; no chance to simper with French athletes, make rousing speeches, or insinuate his presence into the heart of it all is squandered. All the while, behind the scenes, other games are being played: secretive conclaves and tête-à-têtes in discreet upmarket restaurants; an overture here, a sounding there. Grown-up politics.

Act 3: Countdown to the coup

With the Olympics finally over, the horse-trading becomes more overt. A stream of political luminaries makes its way to the Elysée Palace; figures of every political hue are called in for consultation as Macron strives to stitch together his own preferred election outcome. He has in mind a coalition from which both “extremes” are excluded: not simply the neo-fascist RN but also the radical left La France Insoumise: the New Popular Front’s chief architect and most steadfast force. The trouble is that nobody of any stature or credibility seems ready to come to the aid of an unpopular lame-duck President bent on completing his second term.

Nobody, that is, until Michel Barnier is summoned from political obsolescence.

The individual whom Macron has just imposed on the nation comes from Les Républicains, a discredited and much diminished party of the centre-right, which finished a distant fourth in this summer’s legislative elections. Verily a case of “the first coming last and the last coming first”, as Dominique de Villepin, a political veteran of noted stature and principle, quipped recently, referencing a celebrated biblical formulation.

But beyond its brazenness and chutzpah, Macron’s putsch embodies something more sinister. The fact is that Barnier’s impromptu resurrection is closely tied to his role, two years ago, in spearheading his party’s rightward shift on immigration. By virtue of that, he is the preferred choice of the Rassemblement National, on whose support, or at least acquiescence, he and his administration now depend.

Marine Le Pen must be revelling in her new role as arbiter of the nation’s destiny.

Susan Ram has spent much of her life viewing the world from different geographical locations. Born in London, she studied politics and international relations before setting off for South Asia: first to Nepal, and then to India, where fieldwork in Tamil Nadu developed into 20 years of residence.