India-Pakistan relations have been barren for over five years now with no green shoots in sight. Instead, the stage is set for a fresh round of bitterness and confrontation. Reports indicate that India has formally invoked Article XII(3) of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), seeking its modification. India’s move is not surprising considering Pakistan’s obstructionism on projects which India considers valid under the IWT. Going by its initial response, Pakistan seems to have sidestepped India’s demand by stating that all issues can be addressed by the two countries’ respective IWT commissioners. India is unlikely to be satisfied with this response.

The promise of a positive change in ties with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s initiatives in 2014-15 and a ready response from Nawaz Sharif, his Pakistani counterpart then, was sabotaged by the men in khaki. A glimmer of hope emerged in 2018 with the electoral victory of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI). With the support of the establishment, the party’s leader, Imran Khan, became the Prime Minister.

Broken hopes

For a while, it appeared that Pakistan’s focus would shift to geo-economics to ensure the country’s economic stability and growth. However, the generals could not abandon terrorism as part of their strategic doctrine against India; the Pulwama terrorist attack in February 2019 was its manifestation. The dangerous confrontation that occurred with India’s Balakot aerial strike was defused with Pakistan coming under quiet but immediate international pressure. The Indian action demonstrated that the first step on the escalatory ladder between two states with nuclear weapons is an unacceptable terrorist strike. A hiatus in bilateral ties followed, and the Lok Sabha election was held in April-May 2019, wherein the BJP led by Modi secured a significant victory.

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Any hope that fresh moves to restore India-Pakistan ties to an even keel would be afoot after the election was dashed by Pakistan’s bitter and intense reaction to India’s decision to abolish Jammu and Kashmir’s special status with the abrogation of Article 370 and divide the State into two Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. These constitutional changes, made on August 5, 2019, were in accordance with the traditional ideological position of the BJP. They have now received the Supreme Court’s endorsement although the BJP-led government has given an assurance that it will restore statehood to Jammu and Kashmir at the appropriate time. Pakistan took the view that the constitutional changes regarding Jammu and Kashmir marked a material change to the character of what it considers is an “international dispute”. It expressed special anxiety that India would change the erstwhile State’s demographic composition over time.

Significantly, it lashed out at the Sangh Parivar and its ideology, calling it Nazi and fascist. Pakistan also used China to invoke the UN Security Council (UNSC) mechanism to discuss India’s moves. The council members met informally but declined to take up the matter. They took the view that Jammu and Kashmir problems had to be resolved bilaterally between India and Pakistan. This only reinforced the Indian position that UNSC resolutions have become “obsolete”.

While objecting to the August 5 changes, Pakistan clearly overlooked the enormous changes, including demographic, that it has brought about in territories under its illegal and forcible control in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.

Pakistan also undertook specific steps against India to show its opposition to the constitutional changes. These included downgrading its diplomatic mission in India and asking India to do the same. These were no longer to be led by High Commissioners. Also, it suspended commercial ties. Thus, Pakistan’s acrimony, both practical and rhetorical, ensured that bilateral ties reached a new low in 2019. Meanwhile, its calibrated sponsorship of terror against India and its support for the Afghan Taliban continued.

It also went ahead with its traditional support for Khalistan and pursued its desire to wean away the loyalty of Indian Sikhs—a desire that will never fructify but that will not stop Pakistan from perpetually trying. In August 2021, Pakistan achieved a great but, as was proved soon, Pyrrhic victory in Afghanistan when, in the wake of the US withdrawal, the Afghan Taliban re-established its rule over the country after a gap of two decades.

Frayed ties

The trajectory of the India-Pakistan relationship between 2014 and 2020-21 was a repeat of past cycles of promise and failure. Since then, an overview of the domestic situations and foreign policy pursuits of the two countries and their bilateral attitudes demonstrates their vastly different concerns and preoccupations. These have necessarily impacted their bilateral ties. More importantly, they hold important pointers for the future.

Pakistan has had a hybrid government since 2018, but Imran Khan, who was admittedly gaining popular support, thought that he could intervene in the army’s internal functioning. No Pakistani army chief allows that, although Gen. Qamar Bajwa indulged Khan once by showing Lt Gen. Asim Munir the door as Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in 2019. Munir had earned Khan’s ire because he had warned him against the corrupt practices of his wife Bushra Bibi’s friends. Munir was replaced by Lt Gen. Faiz Hameed, who soon became Khan’s favourite and helped him in political management.

In October 2021, Bajwa moved Hameed out of the ISI, but Khan resisted the move, only to finally give in. Khan’s reluctance, however, made Bajwa and his supporting generals lose faith in him. Soon, the army moved to build an alliance of the opposition Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), or PML(N), the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl) against Khan.

Pakistan’s internal politics

This move culminated in April 2022 with the ouster of Khan and the installation of a Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) government. It was led by PML(N)’s Shehbaz Sharif, who ensured that Khan did not have any role in choosing Bajwa’s successor in November 2022. The general chosen by Shehbaz Sharif, at the insistence of his brother Nawaz Sharif, the acknowledged leader of the party, was Asim Munir.

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Munir has an undying hatred of Khan. He decided that Khan could never be allowed to become Pakistan’s Prime Minister. He went along with the PDM to embroil Khan in several court cases so that he could be imprisoned. On May 9, 2023, when Khan was arrested, his supporters in the PTI went on a rampage, targeting military installations and monuments dedicated to venerated army martyrs. That was too much for Munir to take. He moved ruthlessly against the PTI and army officers who sympathised with Khan. The PDM government gave way to a caretaker government in August 2023, but national elections were delayed and held only in February 2024. The PTI could not contest as a party, and Khan remained in jail. Independents who aligned with Khan, however, did well. In the end, Munir was able to get the PML(N) to form a government with the outside support of the PPP.

Under a pact between the two parties, the PPP’s actual head, Asif Zardari, became President. There is no immediate danger to this political arrangement that is overseen by Munir, but Pakistani politics continues to remain unstable.

Along with political instability, Pakistan has also been in the throes of a serious economic crisis. Its macro-economic situation has been dire through the past three years. It was saved from default because of the generosity of its traditional donors and the IMF. The latter, however, extracted a price by forcing the withdrawal of some food and energy subsidies, which led to popular distress. Pakistan will soon begin its 24th IMF support programme. But, since it refuses to change course on its security policies, it is unlikely to attract foreign investment except from China under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project.

Taliban troubles

Besides, Pakistan is entangled with the Afghan Taliban, which is supporting the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, and there is no resolution in sight. Finally, the Pakistani elite have no faith in their country. Hence, the country’s economic situation will continue to remain difficult for the foreseeable future.

As for India, it has shown little public interest in Pakistan’s domestic situation through the past four years. Besides, the security focus of India’s political and strategic classes, as well as that of the public, has decisively shifted to China after the Galwan incident of 2020, wherein Indian and Chinese troops were involved in skirmishes that resulted in fatalities.

Pakistani terrorism remains a deep and continuing concern, but it is not a strategic challenge. It can, however, lead to major bilateral eruptions, and there could have been one if the casualty figures had been higher in the Reasi terrorist attack that took place on June 9 this year, the day Modi took oath for the third time as Prime Minister. Pakistan has also kept up the terrorist activity in Jammu and Kashmir, this time in the Jammu sector.

In all this, the ceasefire along the international boundary in Jammu and Kashmir and the Line of Control (LoC), which was reached between the two countries in February 2021, has largely held. It is credibly believed that the common “friends” of the two countries from the Arabian Peninsula persuaded them to cool temperatures and agree to a ceasefire. This suited both, especially Pakistan, which is particularly vulnerable in the Neelum Valley. Ever since Pakistan’s troubles with the Afghan Taliban increased, its need for calm on its eastern frontier is obvious. Thus, the likelihood of the ceasefire continuing to hold is high.

SAARC in doldrums

One continuing casualty of the India-Pakistan issue has been the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Summits have not been held since 2016 because of India’s objections to Pakistani terrorism. Other SAARC countries have supported it. One of the problems with the absence of SAARC or South Asian cooperation is the neglect in developing a common approach on mitigating and adopting measures to tackle climate change.

South Asia is one geographical unit, and the impact of climate change, in the Himalaya for instance, is of great concern for the entire region. The entire region is also getting water stressed. This is particularly true in the case of Pakistan, which has mismanaged its water situation over the decades but wrongly blames India for it.

Political realities trump the possibilities of cooperation in this and other areas that can contribute to the well-being of all South Asian people. As the largest country in the region, India has a special responsibility, but that also requires other countries to accept that Indian security concerns have to be addressed. That has to begin with Pakistan abandoning terrorism and adopting a rational approach towards Jammu and Kashmir. Neither outcome is likely since the Pakistani generals believe that confrontation with India is essential not only for their national but also their corporate interests. They have been willing to be China’s cat’s paw in South Asia rather than adopt cooperative policies with India. This is not going to change.

On its part, India, through the comments of External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, has been periodically sending tough messages to Pakistan, emphasising that it must cease terror and drop its confrontationist approach. Jaishankar, while making strong pronouncements, must be more accurate in his statements. It is also significant that Modi reportedly did not send the customary message of greetings to Shehbaz Sharif when he recently flew over Pakistan. And Shehbaz Sharif’s greetings to Modi on his third oath-taking and the latter’s response to it were bare and routine.

No scope for handshake

Are there any prospects of a change in the orientation of India-Pakistan ties in the foreseeable future? The answer is no. A fundamental modification in Pakistan’s approach is needed. And this is something the Pakistani army, the guardian of the country’s territory and foundational ideology, will simply not allow. Can there be a thaw so that a return to the pre-August 2019 position occurs? The elected leadership would perhaps favour this, for it would help attract investments, especially after rating agencies gave Pakistan a feeble thumbs up in late August.

Pakistan has invited India for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) Heads of Government meeting to be held in Islamabad on October 15-16. This SCO forum comes below the Heads of States forum in the organisation. Hence, there is no question of Modi attending it. Besides, he did not attend the SCO summit held in July in Astana, Kazakhstan; Jaishankar represented him.

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India may send a representative to the Islamabad SCO meeting. Even then, significant bilateral discussions on its sidelines are improbable because Pakistan has not indicated a change in its current positions on Jammu and Kashmir and terrorism, and Modi appears unwilling to return to the peacemaking efforts he tried in 2014-15. Hence, at best, a courtesy meeting between the Indian and Pakistani representatives may take place.

Vivek Katju is a retired Indian Foreign Service officer. He served as Ambassador to Afghanistan from March 2002 to January 2005.