In your sermon on Friday (October 11, 2024), you referred to a consolidated ballot being cast by the people of Kashmir. Could you explain what you mean by that?

You have to understand the context of these elections. Although Hurriyat has always maintained that elections, civic elections, and the overall Kashmir issue are two different things, it’s true that in the past, the Hurriyat Conference used to boycott the elections. This was because New Delhi often highlighted these elections as an alternative to a political solution or settlement of Kashmir. That’s why we used to distance ourselves from this process. We used to say that elections can be for governance, for “sadak, bijli, paani” (roads, electricity, water), but elections cannot substitute for a conflict management process.

Although this election is also for the civic legislature, I think the focus has shifted completely after the post-2019 situation. This mandate or voting pattern shown by the people is a clear indication that it’s a mandate against the unilateral changes initiated by New Delhi after 2019. It’s rejecting the impression that the government of India is giving—that post-2019, some “Naya Kashmir” (New Kashmir) has been developed and people are satisfied and happy with what’s going on on the ground.

People felt it was important to send a consolidated message by voting for one party. This might not have been the best choice given NC’s past, but given the present situation, people thought it better to consolidate behind one party. This party can, to some extent, try to reverse this process of disempowerment which has happened over the last five to six years.

It was a voice against the fact that people have been disempowered. People are concerned about their land rights, jobs, and their cultural and religious identity. There has been an overall assault on every aspect of Kashmiri life over the last five to six years. This time, the election was more about Kashmiris giving a united message to New Delhi that we reject those unilateral changes. It’s a vote against the BJP and against the policies of the Narendra Modi government.

There were other candidates who pretended to be separatists as well, and they were roundly rejected, as was the PDP (Peoples Democratic Party).

I think the PDP’s rejection is obviously because of their alliance with the BJP in 2014. People feel that this party is responsible for bringing the BJP into Kashmir politics. There was anger against that.

Regarding other parties, there was an impression among the people that suddenly we saw so many players coming into the electoral arena. It felt at times that there were more candidates than voters. People thought it was some sort of ploy on the part of New Delhi to consolidate the mandate in Jammu and completely disintegrate the mandate in the Valley, creating division within the community here.

Look at what happened post-elections—the way five more council Members were introduced in the Assembly, the gerrymandering of constituencies. The people of Kashmir were aware of what games New Delhi is playing.

It’s very clear that, to a large extent, people believe the National Conference (NC) is mainly responsible for the problems in Jammu and Kashmir since 1947. But if you ask me why they voted for NC, I think right now people felt they had to choose a lesser evil. Even the NC wasn’t expecting to get so many seats on their own.

The vote this time defines people’s anger. It also puts the NC in a position where they can’t undermine the people’s mandate. They have a clear mandate on what issues they have to take up with the Central government—the issues of Article 370, Article 35A, identity issues, land, jobs, statehood, and all those constitutional commitments that New Delhi had made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. So I think this time, the election was quite different compared to the usual sadak, bijli, paani issues.

What is your assessment of the events of August 5, 2019? What was the driving force? And after that, also the changes in the Assembly? Was the objective to get a Chief Minister from outside the valley? Or is there an ideological underpinning that drives the BJP and RSS?

If you look at the focus of the BJP, they’ve always claimed that Article 370 has been responsible for separatism. But I don’t understand this; there’s absolutely no link between Article 370 and the separatist movement or the people’s movement. The youth who died, even the people who took up arms or went to jail, were not concerned about Article 370 because that was never their agenda.

We understand why BJP was projecting it as something significant. They were trying to give an impression to the rest of India that because of Article 370, Kashmir had a separate constitution and separate legislation. Although all those things were already diluted completely by the Congress and the National Conference, only a skeleton remained. They were trying to give this impression of Ek Pradhan, Ek Nishan, Ek Samvidhan (One Prime Minister, One Flag, One Constitution), that Kashmir is somehow special and not fully integrated into India.

Article 370 was already hollowed out. I think they used it to give an impression that removing it would integrate Kashmiris into mainstream India, which obviously is not the case. That’s what we’ve been saying—as long as the erstwhile State of J&K, including Ladakh, Azad Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan, remains divided, the situation won’t change.

Whatever the BJP aims to do or intends to sell, the fact remains that as long as there is one area with Pakistan, one area with India, and now post-2019, one area effectively with China (referring to Ladakh), the issue remains internationalised. China has also condemned India’s unilateral decision. So, contrary to the BJP’s belief that they’ve made it an internal matter, we believe they’ve internationalised it further. China was not a player before; now they’re a direct player because they control a territory of J&K.

How would you assess a Prime Minister like Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who was also from the BJP, compared to Mr. Narendra Modi and his policies? You were all part of a process at that time. So how do you see it? Are these two different BJPs, or is it one BJP which didn’t have a majority then, and now is far more strengthened and has more authority?

To be honest, I don’t think that even if Vajpayee had the majority, he would have gone the way Mr. Modi has. I think Vajpayee, despite whatever differences we might have had regarding his role with Babri Masjid and other issues, to some extent understood that this problem is a legacy of the past that we have to address.

I remember meeting Vajpayee when he was Prime Minister. I was very young, probably in the late 1990s. We had gone to see him with Professor Sahib, and he said two things I remember. He said, “Is gutthi ko suljhana hai” (We must resolve this knot). He even said, “Agar hume alag bhi hona hai, to bhai ke tarah hona hai, dushman ke tarah nahi” (Even if we have to separate, we’ll do so as brothers, not as enemies).

When he became the Prime Minister, he understood that there had to be an internal process with the people of Kashmir and an external process with Pakistan. That’s why he took that bus trip to Pakistan. Unfortunately, issues like Kargil happened after that, which shouldn’t have.

I think the old BJP understood that there’s a political dimension, a human dimension, and a historical dimension to this whole problem, and that’s where they wanted to move forward. For example, I remember we were talking about the Constitution, and we were of the view that there should be unconditional talks. Vajpayee was also of this view. When the question of “within the constitution or outside the constitution” came up, he coined the term “within the ambit of insaniyat” (humanity). He said we would talk within the ambit of humanity, and that settled the discourse completely. It addressed all reservations.

Now, how do you see the BJP?

I think it’s completely different now. They want to completely finish the identity of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. They don’t realise that Kashmir is the only Muslim-dominated State. We are watching what’s happening with the rest of the Muslims in India as well over the last five years—the way their houses are being bulldozed, what’s happening in UP [Uttar Pradesh], what’s happening with madrasahs, what’s happening with the Waqf, the JPC [Joint Parliamentary Committee], and everything.

The people of Kashmir are more wary today. During the Congress or Vajpayee’s time, at least there was a secular India we were looking at. Now it’s a completely Hinduized and Hindutva India we’re looking at. So how can we expect Kashmiris to feel closer to New Delhi compared to before, given their current policies?

There is strong resentment in Kashmir regarding policies towards Muslims and how minorities are being treated. Jammu and Kashmir people are very politically aware because we live in a conflict, we are part of a conflict. People are looking at what’s happening in India, in the Parliament, in the streets of UP and other places.

Even for the Parliament, they connected Ladakh with some other seats. The whole exercise seems to be about how the Muslim vote could be limited and the other vote could be strengthened. I think this communal politics is a very dangerous game which the BJP is playing with J&K.

What is your sense of how this government will fare, given that its powers are severely impaired and the Centre is very much strengthened?

I think it will be a constant struggle for them to do anything on the ground. Even Class IV employees (meaning peons and such) are now under the Central government’s control. People understand what motive the BJP has vis-à-vis Jammu and Kashmir and where they come from. But I think to some extent, at least now that people have chosen these representatives, there will be some resistance. Until now, it was completely one-way; there was no setup, no authority, no framework.

I feel the BJP has to see beyond electoral gains and benefits. In terms of India’s interest and national interest, I don’t think what they’re doing in Kashmir or Jammu and Kashmir is helping their national cause. On one hand, India’s concept is to integrate everyone, but on the other hand, they’re completely isolating a state, isolating a population.

I believe that the gap between New Delhi and Srinagar has widened more compared to the times when there was militancy and violence on the ground. Today, I’m sorry to say this, but there is hate because of what the state of India is doing in Kashmir.

The sad part is, I’m not talking about only Congress, but other parties as well. It seems all the regional parties, all the other parties, nobody’s questioning anything on Kashmir. Even parties like Aam Aadmi Party, who earlier spoke about Article 370, are now silent.

So you think that this government will have to tread very carefully in Srinagar?

I think so. I think it’s not going to be easy for them because people have expectations. We see what’s happening in Delhi with [Arvind] Kejriwal, [Manish] Sisodia, and others protesting on the streets every day. I think, at least in Kashmir, there will be some resistance to Central policies.

You were in detention for a long time. You were not allowed to even go to the Jama Masjid to deliver your sermon. So what is the situation now?

Since August 4, 2019, till September of 2023, for four and a half years, I was completely under house arrest. This arrest was completely arbitrary and illegal. There was no case, nothing at all. They would just block my gate and not let anybody in. Anyway, we went to the court, and that process started. Now, relatively, I’m able to move. But again, from time to time, it’s completely at their beck and call. Anytime they can block my gate, anytime they’ll tell me that I’m not allowed to move out. So there is no guarantee.

Previously, I would give programs. We had religious programs, social programs, and political programs. Now it’s very limited because many of the Hurriyat constituents have been banned post-2019. Structurally, the Hurriyat is weakened, but I think emotionally and as far as the aspirational point of Kashmir is concerned, Hurriyat will be there. Hurriyat is not a party, it’s a concept. In the 1930s, it was the Muslim Conference, then it was Mahaz-e-Rai Shumari, then it was others, and it was Sheikh Abdullah at one time. So it keeps on changing. Maybe they might demolish the structure of the Hurriyat, but the sentiment of the Hurriyat is not going to be destroyed because there is a genuine feeling among the people that this problem has to be addressed once and for all—its political dimension, human dimension.

I’ve been limited because I was not allowed to meet the press also. Even now, I’m sure if you had come with a camera, they would not have allowed you here. My movements are very monitored. They say I have security threats and concerns, but if there are security threats and concerns for everybody, everybody else moves. But I’m asked to stay at home. So there’s obviously more to it. They want me to be more confined to my house.

But anyway, wherever I get a chance, we are talking. We are giving this message that look, even last Friday, I said that the way in which we are projected by New Delhi, by the BJP—as separatists, as anti-India—is sad. I said that we believe that it is in the national interest of the people of India to address this problem. So who is anti-national? We don’t want violence, we don’t want our youth to pick up guns. We don’t want them to get consumed in the violence or the conflict. But we do want this problem to have a fair closure.

This is the third or fourth generation which is dealing with this issue. As long as one part is with India and one with Pakistan, this issue will remain alive. Whatever internal changes they might make, whatever structural changes they might make, the problem is still very much there. This problem is not going to go unless we devise a mechanism.

That’s why we remind Mr. Modi from time to time that you had a mechanism where you were talking, you were addressing the issue. We had reached some conclusions. We were talking about soft borders, bus services, trade, an end to militancy, end to violence. I think that is something that maybe, if not from this BJP, but maybe after that, whichever dispensation comes, and I hope the regional parties and other parties also realise that unilateral actions won’t solve the issue. Despite India-Pakistan bilateral talks, unilateral changes were made.

What you are saying is that when the bilateral process has not worked, how…

Exactly, how will Kashmiris accept that?