The Haryana Assembly election in 2024 threw up a historic victory for the Bharatiya Janata Party. For the first time since the State’s formation in 1966, a party has formed a government for a third successive term. This victory marks the BJP’s largest win in the last three Assembly elections. The BJP won 48 of the 90 Assembly seats, while the Congress won 37 seats. The electoral contest was nail-biting and bipolar in terms of vote share, with the two major parties receiving nearly 80 per cent of the votes polled in the election. In terms of vote share, the gap between the BJP and Congress was just 0.8 per cent in favour of the BJP.

It is important to note that in Haryana, the combined vote share of the two major parties had never touched 70 per cent. Even in the 2019 Assembly election, the BJP and the Congress together polled only 64 per cent. What does this number explain? How did the BJP manage to get another term with a bigger share of seats and votes despite facing a palpable anti-incumbency in the State?

The BJP has been ruling the State since 2014. Just before that, in the 2009 Assembly election, the party secured only four seats with 9 per cent of the votes. It won double-digit seats in 1996 only, when it formed an alliance with the Haryana Vikas Party. In that election, the BJP won 11 seats with 9 per cent of the votes. The party has grown remarkably since then in the State, particularly with decisive victories in 2014 and 2019, leveraging caste-based strategies and nationalistic sentiments.

For a long time, the Congress and the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) were the two major parties in the State. However, their combined vote share never crossed two-thirds of the total votes, which means that one-third of the electoral support was for the smaller parties and independent candidates. This trend changed in the 2019 Lok Sabha election, when the BJP and the Congress got 87 per cent of the votes. However, in the 2019 Assembly election, this came down to 64 per cent, with the reason for the decline being the BJP. The party lost 22 per cent of the votes within six months. Once again, in the 2024 parliamentary election, both the BJP and the Congress polled 90 per cent of the total votes. In terms of alliances, the NDA and the INDIA bloc together polled 94 per cent of the votes.

From the 2024 Lok Sabha election to the 2024 Assembly election, the BJP and the Congress lost 6 and 4 per cent votes, respectively. However, this time, the two parties polled 40 and 39 per cent votes, respectively (Chart 1). Two parties have never consolidated this large a vote share in any Assembly election in the State.

Three trends

Apart from the vote consolidation, three trends emerge from the chart above: (1) Both the BJP and the Congress have been gaining votes in each Assembly election since 2014. The BJP’s continuous gain has been since 2009. (2) The INLD (and the Jannayak Janta Party), known to be a Jat-supported party, has been in continuous decline, and its vote share has come down to 5 per cent. (3) The space for smaller parties and Independents has been shrinking fast. These small players used to have around 30 per cent of the votes, which has reduced to 16 per cent in this election. However, there are a significant number of Independents whose votes were more than the margin of victory.

With the final numbers showing bipolarity, it is important to look into the reasons behind it.

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The central narrative of this election revolves around “kisan [farmer], naujawan [youth], pehelwan [wrestler]”. The farmers’ movement organised one of the biggest protests during the NDA’s second term. The protests, in which 700 farmers lost their lives, led the Narendra Modi government to take back the “three farm laws” through which the government intended to bring reform. Farmers of Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh were key to leading this movement, and in the case of Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh, the Jat community participated in a big manner.

As many as 33 per cent of Haryana’s farmers fall under the medium or large category with more than 2 hectares of land. Among them, Jats form the majority. In Sonipat, Devender (35, Dhanak [Lower SC]) and Amit (38, Lohar [Lower OBC]), both auto drivers, said that in their villages, they (the Lower SC and Lower OBC communities) did not have much land of their own and that they worked on the land of Jats. In towns, they said, they were independent, but in rural areas, they had to be economically dependent on Jats. Sometimes the Jats exploited them. “Vo Chaudhary hai aur unki hi chalti hai” (which roughly means, “The writ of the landlords always holds”).

Lack of job opportunities

Among the youth, the main reason for unhappiness against the incumbent government was the lack of job opportunities. Again, this issue is not unique to Haryana. Data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) relating to 2023 (https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/haryana-tops-cmie-unemployment-chart-december-8359324/)indicate that Haryana had the highest unemployment rate in India, exceeding 30 per cent. This built a narrative that the State government was unable to generate/create job opportunities for youths.

The pehelwan movement began last year against the issue of sexual harassment of women wrestlers by the authorities. As a result of this, Brij Bhushan Singh, who was a BJP MP, did not get the ticket in the 2024 parliamentary election.

The“kisan, naujawan, pehelwan” narrative seemed to suggest that a new segment was aligning itself with the Congress. However, it is significant to note that both farmers and wrestlers are essentially representatives of the Jat community. Additionally, a significant proportion of the youth demographic also belongs to this same community. This alignment highlights how the Congress’ appeal was primarily concentrated within specific social groups, rather than genuinely expanding beyond the party’s traditional constituents.

On the other side, BJP leaders used the campaign slogan that during their government, youth had got jobs “bina kharchi, bina parchi” (without paying a bribe and without expecting favouritism).

A notable example of this sentiment emerged during our ground visit in Haryana when a member of the Nai community named Vinod (40) in Panipat told us that one of his brothers got a job in the Haryana Police without spending a paisa. He said it was not possible in the Bhupinder Singh Hooda government. He remarked that during the Hooda government, when they asked for assistance, they were often told: “You can set up a chair anywhere and cut hair, but what will our Jat boys do?”

The example of Lower SCs and OBCs illustrates the growing rift between the backward and Dalit communities and the Jat community, which has directly benefited the BJP. This can be understood from a data point that shows the changing support base of the BJP and the Congress in the Jat belt since 2009. Bhiwani, Charkhi Dadri, Hisar, Jhajjar, Jind, Panipat, Rohtak, and Sonipat districts have a high concentration of Jats. In these districts, the aggregate share of Balmiki and Dhanak is 41 per cent (Census 2011) of the total SC population.

Chart 2 suggests that the Congress’ support base has come to the point where the party was in 2009, and that its support base has returned in the Assembly election. However, it needs to be noted that the Congress party’s highest vote share was in the 2024 Lok Sabha election, at 51 per cent. The BJP was 7 per cent behind the Congress in the Jat belt. It suggests that despite the kisan, naujawan, and pehelwan movements, the Congress lost its ground in the Jat belt.

Congress’ failure to retain non-Jat votes

Any analysis of the Haryana election will show that the lion’s share of Jats voted for the Congress, but the party failed to retain its support among the non-Jats, thereby losing a significant share (12 per cent, double the State-wise loss) of votes in the Jat belt. Contrary to this, the BJP has been able to mobilise its core support, primarily from the OBC and non-Jat privileged-caste Hindus, which is more evenly distributed. This allowed its vote share to translate more efficiently into Assembly seats. This homogeneous distribution of the BJP’s voter base gave it a strategic advantage, resulting in a higher conversion rate of votes to seats compared with the Congress. Of the 36 seats in the Jat belt, the BJP won 20, while the Congress could manage only 13.

Two decades ago in Haryana, the Congress had leaders such as Bansi Lal from the Vishnoe (Bishnoi) community; Rao Inderjit Singh and Captain Ajay Singh Yadav from among the Ahir community; Bhupinder Hooda, Chaudhary Birender Singh, and Kiran Choudhry from the Jat community; and Kumari Selja and Ashok Tanwar from the SC community—all of whom had a say in party affairs, but this time it was Hooda who dominated.

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The different movements and the one-sided dominance of Hooda created the buzz that if the Congress government came to power, it would be a Jat dominance (Jatshahi), which reminded the lower sections of society about the exploitation and dominance they had faced in the past. As Vinod (Panipat) said: “Abhi to hamse 10 rupaye lete hai,lekin ye satta me aa gaye to 100 rupaye lene lagenge, aur hame dena padega” (Right now, the auto drivers near Panipat bus stand charge us Rs.10, but if they come to power, we will be forced to pay Rs.100).

It is not that only Jats supported the Congress this time; other castes did too. But the majority of the party’s votes came from Jats, Jatavs (Upper SC), and Muslims. Together, they constitute around 40 per cent of the electorate. On the other hand, the BJP has been using social engineering since 2014 to form a coalition of non-dominant castes. In States such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, and Haryana the BJP did its best to build an ethnic coalition of politically marginalised communities.

The BJP also made a smart move on the Supreme Court’s August verdict on sub-categorisation for SCs and ST. In Haryana, SC voters account for 21 per cent of the electorate, with around 12 per cent belonging to the most vulnerable and deprived sections of the SC community, such as Balmiki and Dhanak. Ahead of the election, when the Supreme Court allowed the subclassification of SCs and STs, to create separate quotas within these groups, the BJP astutely embraced the decision at the State level.

In the previous general election, the Dalit community had largely supported the Congress because Rahul Gandhi’s “Save the Constitution” narrative had resonated strongly among them. However, when the issue of subclassification emerged with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Congress chose to remain silent. This silence cost the party dearly, as the most marginalised sections of the Dalit community felt neglected and abandoned.

As a result, these most vulnerable groups, which had earlier backed the Congress, shifted support away from the party, giving the BJP a crucial advantage. The BJP’s ability to address the specific needs of this deprived segment helped it consolidate support and gain momentum in key constituencies where the Congress had previously held sway.

The BJP adopted a mixed strategy to mitigate the impact of anti-incumbency. Prime Minister Modi’s rallies were reduced, and fewer posters featuring him were displayed at the local level. At the State level, several key Ministers, including the Chief Minister, were replaced with new faces before the election. The BJP fielded new candidates in 61 of the 90 constituencies, compared with 2019. This move sent a message to voters that their grievances were being heard and that the party cared about their concerns. And the BJP won 34 of the 61 Assembly seats. In contrast, during the 2019 Assembly election, the BJP won only 18 seats of the same 61 constituencies. Thus, the BJP effectively neutralised the effects of anti-incumbency.

This victory reflects the BJP’s successful narrative to build an ethnic coalition against the politics of dominance of a particular caste. What the Congress needs to do is not to leave its social base but to add some new constituencies to its kitty.

Ashish Ranjan is an election researcher and co-founder of the Data Action Lab for Emerging Societies (DALES). Atul Kumar Pandey is an election researcher.