Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, the second sarsanghchalak of the RSS (right), with Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, leader of the Hindu Mahasabha and fellow Hindu nationalist thinker, in Pune. Nathuram Godse, the assassin of Mahatma Gandhi, was a member of both the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha and was obsessed with the idea of making India a Hindu Rashtra.
| Photo Credit: By Special Arrangement

The final act of Golwalkar’s conflict with Gandhi was played out by Nathuram Godse, the RSS hothead from Poona. At the time, Godse edited a local Marathi journal, Hindu Rashtra, just as his mentor, Kashinath Bhaskar Limaye, the chief of the Maharashtra unit of the RSS and one of the closest aides of Golwalkar, edited Vikram, another pro-Hindutva Marathi journal published from Sangli. N. D. Apte, a member of the Hindu Mahasabha, was the general manager of Hindu Rashtra. Limaye, Godse and Apte were also bound by their loyalty to V. D. Savarkar and had in the past organized the Hindu Rashtra Dal as a joint venture between the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha. There is no specific evidence to suggest that Golwalkar, as the chief of the RSS, ever disapproved of the Hindu Rashtra Dal. The idea of a Hindu Rashtra, which Golwalkar pushed through his nationwide network of shakhas, was of profound significance to all three, but seems to have exercised a particularly strong hold over Godse.

While most of the RSS men shared Golwalkar’s anger on Gandhi’s determined bid to obstruct efforts to force Muslims to leave India, a few of them possessed Godse’s intent to remove this stumbling block through violent means. In fact, it was only about three weeks after Golwalkar threatened to ‘silence’ Gandhi on 8 December 1947 that Godse set out to work on an assassination plan. Did Godse, an excessively enthusiastic RSS man, see in those threatening words of the sarsanghchalak some kind of a fatwa to kill Gandhi? Did he ever come to a secret understanding with Golwalkar? Or did he move in that direction on his own? There were theories, but, as there was no thorough investigation into the conspiracy angle in the immediate aftermath of Gandhi’s murder, there could be no certainty or straightforward explanations.

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In any case, there were reasons for Godse wanting to kill Gandhi. As a passionate member of the RSS and the editor of Hindu Rashtra, he had been acting in close concert with the Hindutva movement and was obsessed, like any other member of the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha, with the idea of making India a Hindu Rashtra. He was, therefore, part and parcel of a subterranean and organized Hindutva resistance to the Gandhian project of secular democracy—a resistance which had existed since before 1947, before the country was even thought to be partitioned. Through his nationalism and secularism, Gandhi had comprehensively countered the idea of a Hindu Rashtra, forcing its proponents—the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha—to the margins of Indian politics. This made Gandhi the main target of attack not only by Golwalkar but also by individual members and leaders of the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha. Thus, if Godse, imagining himself as the deliverer of the idea of the Hindu Rashtra, set out to kill Gandhi, he seemed to have been resolving what might be described as a battle for the soul of India, an anxious and longstanding conflict to define the emerging nation state. The putative resolution posited by Godse can be seen a desperate attempt, but it was very much part of the struggle that Golwalkar had launched.

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In twenty-four hours, the RSS had fallen apart, its members scattered or at odds. It seemed as though Golwalkar’s period of ascent was over. With the assassination of Gandhi, all hopes for his project of a Hindu Rashtra collapsed. Prior to the assassination, Golwalkar and his cadres had been riding a tide of anti-Partition, anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim feelings. No doubt, Gandhi’s fast had weakened the tide, but it had not vanished completely—sections of Hindu and Sikh refugees and those under the spell of the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha still carried the hatred against Muslims. The assassination shook India to normalcy. Rapidly, almost instantaneously, the tide turned. In one stroke, public opinion took a great swing away from the champions of a Hindu Rashtra. Coming soon after Gandhi’s painful fast, the murder appeared to be an act of reactionary conspirators desperate to set India in new ideological directions.

What the events would mean ultimately for the RSS was difficult to predict, but within twenty-four hours of the assassination, Golwalkar was searching for ways to save the organization from ruin and to salvage some of its standing. The grief of the multitude was unendurable, and people seemed to have lost their minds. On Sunday, 1 February, Golwalkar issued a statement to the press. ‘In the presence of this appalling tragedy I hope people will learn the lesson and practice the doctrine of love and service,’ it said. ‘Believing in this doctrine, I direct all my brother swayamsevaks to maintain a loving attitude towards all, even if there be any sort of provocation born out of misunderstanding and to remember that even this misplaced frenzy is an expression of unbounded love and reverence, in which the whole country held the great Mahatma, the man who made the name of our motherland great in the world. Our salutation to the revered departed one.’

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This was not the usual language for the RSS to use about Gandhi. When he was alive, it had spread venom against him and had even wished his death when he sat on fast a fortnight ago. Golwalkar’s own view of Gandhi, as he explained it to RSS men on 8 December 1947 in Delhi, was that the Mahatma had gone off the deep end and become disloyal to Hindus by blocking efforts to cleanse India of Muslims, the reason why he had threatened to ‘silence’ him. Now, panicked at people’s fury, Golwalkar espoused a new line, abandoning—at least publicly—his plan of undertaking ethnic cleansing of Muslims and establishing a Hindu Rashtra. What he claimed instead was that he believed in the ‘doctrine’ of Gandhi.

In actual fact, Golwalkar no longer had a choice. There was not much he could do except to desperately look for a way out. Making new pledges could not be an issue at a time when hesitation seemed fatal. This also explains why the RSS leadership did not take time to abandon Godse, even though he had served the organization for fourteen years.

Dhirendra K. Jha is a Delhi-based journalist and author. Excerpted with permission of Simon & Schuster India from Golwalkar: The Myth Behind the Man, The Man Behind the Machine by Dhirendra K. Jha.

In Iconoclast: A Reflective Biography of Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar, Dr Anand Teltumbde, a distinguished public intellectual, and leading authority on the Dalit movement, presents a groundbreaking biography of Dr B.R. Ambedkar. Teltumbde strips away the layers of myth and hyperbole to reveal the man behind the legend.

Teltumbde delves into the life of Ambedkar, situating him within the dynamic context of his time. He explores the complexities of Ambedkar’s persona, offering a nuanced portrait that challenges conventional perceptions. Rich with photographs, this biography paints a vivid picture of Ambedkar as a visionary, as a human, and above all, as an iconoclast driven by a relentless pursuit of social justice and equality. From his tireless advocacy for the Dalit community to his visionary ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, Ambedkar’s legacy reverberates through the ages, inspiring generations to strive for a more just society. An excerpt from the chapter “Dalits get their leader”:

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While striking the Poona Pact, Gandhi promised to devote himself to the task of eradicating untouchability. Just five days after signing the Poona Pact, Gandhi founded the All India Anti Untouchability League on 30 September 1932, which was later renamed as Harijan Sevak Sangh (Servants of Untouchables Society). At the time, industrialist Ghanshyam Das Birla was its founding president with Amritlal Thakkar as its secretary. In 1933, Gandhi renamed his newspaper Young India as Harijan, and undertook a twenty-one-day ‘self-purication fast’ against untouchability. He asked for a message for the inaugural issue of Harijan from Ambedkar, to which Ambedkar sent a blunt reply: ‘I feel I cannot give a message. For I believe it will be a most unwarranted presumption on my part to suppose that I have sufficient worth in the eyes of the Hindus which would make them treat any message from me with respect . . . I am therefore sending you the accompanying statement for publication in your Harijan.’

The essence of his statement was what he would elaborate on in his Annihilation of Caste after four years: ‘Nothing can emancipate the Out-caste except the destruction of the Caste system. Nothing can help to save Hindus and ensure their survival in the coming struggle except the purging of the Hindu Faith of this odious and vicious dogma.’

Gandhi also took a march across the country from November 1933 through August 1934, covering 12,500 miles by vehicle and foot and collecting Rs 8,00,000 for the Harijan fund. Ambedkar was taken onboard of the Anti-Untouchability League, one of the three Untouchables among the total nine members. He anticipated it to be a comprehensive civil rights group focused on securing civic liberties for Dalits, including access to public spaces, utilization of public amenities, and broader civil freedoms, all under Dalit control.

Also Read | Ambedkar, Gandhi and Jinnah

However, Gandhi transformed it into a paternalistic organization, overseen by caste Hindus aiming for the ‘upliftment’ of Untouchables. This stemmed from his fundamental philosophy, which regarded untouchability as a sin within Hinduism, to be expiated by the Hindus. It was not an inherent aspect of the religion, but rather a flaw that could be rectified. According to Gandhi, upper-caste Hindus should acknowledge and atone for this sin, make reparations, and undertake initiatives for the purification and elevation of Dalits. This involved activities such as engaging in slum clean-up efforts, advocating against alcoholism, promoting vegetarianism, and similar endeavours.

Ambedkar proposed that the League could undertake a campaign for intercaste marriages and intercaste dining so as to weaken castes. But the League rejected it. All the untouchable members resigned immediately.

For Ambedkar, the entire plan of the Harijan Sevak Sangh was worse than useless. He condemned the Harijan Sevak Sangh in strong language: ‘The work of the Sangh is of the most inconsequential kind. It does not catch anyone’s imagination. It neglects the most urgent purposes for which the Untouchables need help and assistance. The Sangh rigorously excludes the Untouchables from its management. The Untouchables are no more than beggars, mere recipients of charity.’

After induction on the Board of the Anti-Untouchability League formed in the aftermath of the Poona Pact, Ambedkar wrote a six-page letter on 14 November 1932 to A.V. Thakkar, general secretary, outlining his views on the concrete programme to be taken up by the League. Pointing out the need to take up a campaign to secure civil rights for the Depressed Classes, he preferred the behavioural school that focuses on amelioration of the social environment as against improvement in individual behaviour, as it believes that the latter is largely conditioned by the former.

He explained, ‘It starts with the hypothesis that the fate of the individual is governed by the environment and the circumstances he is obliged to live under, and if an individual is suffering from want and misery it is because his environment is not propitious.’ He cautioned that it would entail violence in rural areas and ‘criminal prosecutions of one side or the other’. He also pointed out that in these struggles ‘the Depressed Classes will suffer badly because the Police and the Magistracy will always be against them’. ‘The Police and Magistracy are corrupt as they could be, but what is worse is that they are definitely political in the sense that they are out not to see that justice is done, but to see that the dignity and interests of the caste Hindus as against the Depressed Classes are upheld.’ Therefore, he recommended the League to create an army of workers in the rural parts, ‘who will encourage the Depressed Classes to fight for their rights and will help them in any legal proceedings arising therefrom to a successful issue’. He emphasized that ‘this programme involves social disturbance and even bloodshed. But I do not think that it can be avoided’.

The other measures he proposed were: creating equality of opportunity, social intercourse and employment of an agency to carry out the programme. This reflected a profound learning from his experience in Mahad wherein he thwarted the counterattack by the Dalits when they were attacked by the caste Hindu goons for polluting the Chowdar Tank. It does not spell just resistance, which in any case needed to follow as part of the struggle, but more importantly it becomes a cultural shock to challenge their age-old customs and traditions. His attitude to violence also reveals that there are situations where violence is inevitable. If he concedes that violence could not be avoided in a simple case of changing peoples’ behaviour, he would surely see what would entail if the societal economic structure needed to be overhauled. The question of violence or non-violence is not a question of principle, it is a question of strategy. He rightly reads here violence as being a constitutive element of any secure social order.

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The other measures he suggested were bringing about ‘equality of opportunity’, social intercourse, and employing an agency to implement the programme.

This letter with such a clear-headed contribution was not even acknowledged by Thakkar. The League continued work under the influence of Gandhian paternalism and did not want even to seek views of the Depressed Class members. Realising it, Ambedkar resigned from the League, which was later followed by P. Balu, Srinivasan and Rajah.

He concluded that the Untouchables see the Sangh ‘as a foreign body set up by the Hindus with some ulterior motive… the whole object is to create a slave mentality among the Untouchables towards their Hindu masters’. This, to Ambedkar, was the major thrust of paternalism. More importantly, he explicated, ‘The outcaste is a byproduct of the caste system. There will be outcastes as long as there are castes. Nothing can emancipate the outcaste except the destruction of the caste system. Nothing can help Hindus and ensure their survival in the coming struggle except, the purging of Hindu faith of this odious and vicious dogma.’

If only this principle was stressed in the Constituent Assembly, the euphoria over the abolition of untouchability could have been punctured and possibly the intrigues to preserve castes with an alibi of social justice could have been thwarted. Unfortunately, not only would he not raise this issue in the Constituent Assembly but when raised by others would choose to stay quiet.

Excerpted with permission of Penguin Random House India from Iconoclast: A Reflective Biography of Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar by Anand Teltumbde.