Omar Abdullah: A Chief Minister circumscribed

Omar Abdullah, the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, is caught between a rock and a hard place. His stewardship of the Union Territory (UT) as its first elected head following the revocation of the region’s special status was believed by many to herald in an age of accountability, consensus, and political reassertion that was missing since 2019.

Instead, two-and-a-half months since he took oath, Abdullah is navigating a political scenario that is rife with dissent, a policy paralysis exacerbated by the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019—which tips the balance of power heavily in the favour of the Lieutenant Governor (L-G)—and a strained relationship with the centre that is dithering on its promise of restoring Statehood.

Worse, the many controversial measures that the Centre implemented in Jammu and Kashmir before the Assembly election are generating widespread social unrest, fuelling a renewed wave of protests, at the receiving end of which is Abdullah himself.

Recently, the mounting tensions over the new reservation rules culminated in a massive political showdown on the Gupkar Road in Srinagar, the high seat of political power in Kashmir. This was the first major street protest in Kashmir since 2019, when a clamp-down ended any semblance of dissent.

Students reach the cedars

Behind the windbreak of tall Himalayan cedars, the stately residence of the Abdullahs reverberated with slogans as hundreds of students converged outside, demanding an end to the allocation of new quotas for reserved categories in the UT. Adopted by Kashmir’s gubernatorial administration in March 2024, a statutory order sought to accommodate the Pahari ethnic people and three other groups into the Scheduled Tribes (ST) list, whose quota was increased from 10 to 20 per cent.

The order also amended seven rules of the Jammu and Kashmir Reservation Rules, 2005, further broadening quotas for the other reserved categories such as OBCs, while shrinking the space for the general or open-merit applicants, who account for 69 per cent of Jammu and Kashmir’s population.

Before 2019, the jobs and admissions for reserved categories stood at 52 per cent. In 2024, it stood at 70 per cent. “This breaches the cap of 50 per cent that the Supreme Court has placed on reservations in the 1992 Indra Sawhney case,” said Mir Mujeeb, one of the student leaders who led a delegation to meet Abdullah during last month’s protests.

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The move to tweak the reservation arrangements was not without a political purpose. The BJP government had hoped to woo Paharis who inhabit the tribal belt of Pir Panjal in Jammu which, under the 2022 delimitation programme, was annexed with the Anantnag parliamentary seat in Kashmir.

The Pahari tribes had been demanding the inclusion into the ST category since 1991 and Abdullah, during his first stint as Chief Minister in 2014, had attempted to pass the Bill in this regard but was returned by the then-governor on technical grounds.

Although the BJP could not win the seat in 2024, the arrangement is now built into the system, with the saffron party hoping to capitalise on the goodwill it has cultivated among Paharis, who form a majority in Poonch (56.3 per cent) and Rajouri (56.10 per cent) districts of Pir Panjal.

For Abdullah, however, calling off the mechanisms put in place by the Narendra Modi government with an eye on long-term political investment in the UT is not going to be easy. “But the Chief Minister should demonstrate the political intent,” said Mujeeb. “If someone of higher authority tries to block it, then one can think of taking the issue to the court, as Kejriwal does in Delhi.”

The changes to Kashmir’s reservation system originate from the four Bills passed in the Parliament in February 2024 which Abdullah alone cannot reverse without bringing the Centre on board.

For longer political good?

It is on account of these limitations that Abdullah had tried to appear conciliatory towards the Union government. He had even shunned his usual rhetoric about the restoration of special status. After being elected as Chief Minister, he said that he stood for a “healthy relationship with the Union government”, and added that the issue of Article 370 needed to be put “aside for a moment”.

In his first Cabinet meeting as Chief Minister on October 17, 2024, Abdullah did just that: he adopted a resolution calling for the restoration of Statehood, as opposed to his election promise of passinga resolution that condemned Article 370’s abrogation. It was only after the opposition parties put pressure on him, by unsuccessfully introducing similar resolutions of their own, that Abdullah pushed a “watered-down” draft through the Legislative Assembly, voicing “concern over the unilateral removal” of the special status.

At a certain level, his stand reflects a keen sense of judgement, a willingness to engage with the Centre for the UT’s longer political good. He even signalled this recently. “Jammu and Kashmir runs a deficit budget, therefore we are more dependent on the Government of India than other States and UTs,” Abdullah said last week, during his first address to the media since taking over as Chief Minister. Yet in Kashmir’s politically fractious scenario, it was not long before this “appeasement” ended in debacle.

The protests against the reservation have been spearheaded, ironically, by Aga Ruhullah Mehdi, an MP from Srinagar and Abdullah’s junior colleague in the National Conference (NC). “The reality of Kashmir’s politics is that it has always operated with restricted autonomy,” said Siddiq Wahid, historian and professor at Shiv Nadar University. “The BJP knows this, and since 2014 has widened the gap between voter expectations and the elected government’s autonomy.”

To pacify the calls for the rationalisation of reservation, Abdullah instituted a three-member subcommittee to review the new rules and assess whether they adhere to the Supreme Court rulings in the matter. His hopes now lie with the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court where the case is currently sub judice.

Centre’s clamp down

Meanwhile, the structural constraints associated with the UT system have begun to weigh heavily on Abdullah’s public image. On November 29, 2024, the L-G administration, which oversees security and law and order, dismissed two government employees for their alleged links to terrorist organisations. These terminations were sanctioned under Section 311 (2) (c) of the Indian constitution, an emergency law that waives the requirement of holding an official inquiry. In fact, since 2019, the Jammu and Kashmir government has dismissed 66 employees under the same law, fuelling criticism for their arbitrariness. In its election manifesto, NC had condemned these dismissals and pledged to revisit the cases.

Previously, the L-G took decisions on the continuation of Kashmir’s Advocate General, as well as on the transfer of a Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Services officer in Jammu. In the latter case, it is the elected administration that makes these decisions, and yet it was the L-G who sanctioned the transfer. The L-G office also recently undermined Abdullah by not reinstating the NC founder Sheikh Abdullah’s birthday in the list of holidays.

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Abdullah’s current term as Chief Minister is a far cry from his first (2008-14): he had more latitude then than he has now, when the new UT system circumscribes his authority greatly. During his first term, Kashmir had its special status and his Assembly had powers (with exceptions) to decide which federal law would apply and which would not. But this period was characterised by much unrest, beginning in 2009 with the alleged rape and murder of two women in Shopian that brought the Valley to the brink. Then in 2010, 17-year-old student Tufail Mattoo’s killing triggered a civil uprising, resulting in the deaths of 120 protesters. The relentless political turmoil deepened the anti-incumbency against Abdullah, which eventually led to his defeat in 2014. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, of the Peoples Democratic Party, was sworn in as Chief Minister.

Tailoring Kashmir

Abdullah’s predicament is rooted primarily in the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, which not only demoted the erstwhile State into a UT but overhauled its entire legal architecture, skewing the de facto authority to benefit the Centre-appointed L-G, say legal experts. “Last year, the Home Ministry amended the Reorganisation Act to further grant exclusive powers to the L-G over matters concerning the police, public order, All India Services, Anti-Corruption Bureau, the appointment of the Advocate General, and more,” said Aasif Wani, a lawyer at the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court. 

So, this leaves the restoration of Statehood the only means for Omar to make his way out of the crisis. Although the Union government has often promised to return the UT to Statehood, it has not specified when it will do so. In October 2024, the BJP’s key interlocutor in Kashmir, Ram Madhav, indicated that there could be some degree of tailoring in what Kashmir will receive if Statehood was brought back. “The shape and form of that State will be decided by Parliament,” Madhav said. “There will be discussion, there will be an Act granting certain powers to the UT at the appropriate time.”

Recently, this prevarication over Statehood has prompted Abdullah to use more blunt language in articulating his angst with the Centre; the “dual-system” of governance in Jammu and Kashmir would be a “recipe for disaster”, he said. On January 3, he reiterated the demand for Statehood, citing last year’s Supreme Court’s verdict on the issue of Article 370. “It (SC) said that Statehood be restored ‘as soon as possible’…It has been a year and we believe that that’s enough,” said Abdullah.

But he has also been careful to not portray these “differences” with the L-G as a clash, hoping that whenever the apportion powers between the L-G and Chief Minister are framed, it will be business as usual. 

Political experts in Kashmir believe that restoration will depend on the BJP’s own political calculations. “So far Omar has tried to avoid antagonising Delhi,” explains Noor Ahmad Baba, former professor of political science at the University of Kashmir. “His priority has been to secure Statehood through persuasion and dialogue. If that won’t work, he might want to change his course.”

Shakir Mir is an independent journalist based in Srinagar.