Since the Soviet Union collapsed, a good quarter of Moldovans—no one knows the figure for sure—have chosen to build new lives abroad. Two decades ago roughly half of such emigrants used to headfor jobs in Russia, whichhad ruled them from 1944 to 1991; the other half tried their luck in western Europe. But now the traffic is nearly all westward. Especially since Russia’s assault on Ukraine in 2022, the entire country of 2.5m or so people, with a few peculiar territorial exceptions, has been pivoting towards the EU. A presidential election and simultaneous referendum on October 20th are expected to confirm this trend—so long as Russia’s unprecedented array of dirty tricks can be fended off.
If the opinion polls are right, the incumbent, Maia Sandu, should easily win the first round of the contest against ten other candidates. Her chief opponent is Alexandr Stoianoglo, a staunch pro-Russian. Even if she does not win outright in the first round, she is expected to prevail in a run-off on November 3rd. She is the most dedicated reformer in Moldova’s post-Soviet history—and its most robust fighter against the pervasive blight of corruption.
The referendum, however, matters even more. The voters are being asked to change the constitution to endorse the government’s decision to seek membership of the EU. Russia, determined to win back influence over itsformer peripheral domains, is dead against the idea—and is using every trick to kibosh the yes vote in a brazen campaign of hybrid warfare.
This has entailed a mix of disinformation,bribery and low-level violence, including payments for rowdy protests. Cyber-attacks have targetedthe healthministry and postal services. In April a stringof ATMs werevandalised to spread rumours that the banks were running out of funds.
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Disinformation hurts the EU cause hardest. The Kremlin has relentlessly targeted susceptible groups, especially those who speak Russian as their preferred language, about 15% of the total population. They predominate in the breakaway statelet of Transnistria, sandwiched between the rest of Moldova and Ukraine (see map).
The Gagauz, a still smaller minority (about 5%) of Turkish-descended Christians, are as fiercely pro-Russian. The main street of their capital, Comrat, is still named after Lenin, whose statue takes pride of place. Most signs are in Russian, not Romanian, Moldova’s main tongue. The governor of Gagauziais an underling of Ilan Shor, a fugitive banker now believed to be in Moscow, considered Russia’s key Moldovan oligarch and a big backer of Ms Sandu’s main opponent, Mr Stoianoglo.
Fake news and conspiracy theories against the EU have swamped the popular Telegram app, as well as TikTok, Facebook and YouTube. The EU is said tobe a proxy for NATO, seeking to drag Moldova into war. Greedy foreigners will buy up Moldovan land. Children will be inculcated with the EU’s supposedly “gay values”. “Unfortunately, too many people believe this,” laments a minister.
Bribery is more straightforward. The security service reckons at least 130,000 Moldovans are on Russia’s payroll. Many travel to Russia (often via Turkey or the Caucasus) to collect cash (up to $11,000 may be brought into Moldova in one go) to pay for anti-government demonstrations, to encourage people to vote for pro-Russian candidates in the presidential election and to vote no in the referendum.
But Russia’s message may not be heeded as much as before. Some Moldovan bigwigs known to have been pro-Russian in the past may be hedging their bets; some, like the mayor of Chisinau, the capital, say cagily they are now pro-EU. Others say they want Moldova to “balance relations” between the EU and Russia.
Most strikingly, the tide is turning against Russia even in Transnistria. Voters there will still vote en masse against Ms Sandu and the EU, but their economy and trade have tilted sharply away from Russia towards EUcountries, especially since Ukraine closed its border after the war began. A transit deal whereby gas from Russia has passed through Transnistria, enabling it to curtail supplies to the rest of Moldova, will soon end as Moldova turns to other supply lines. “Transnistria is losingits last big card,” smiles a government adviser.
Victory for Ms Sandu on October 20th will be far from a guarantee of Moldova’s stability. Her presidency has been buffeted by covid-19, the war in Ukraine, an influx of refugees and a bout of soaring inflation. Parliamentary elections next July could knock back her party, which may then have to accept a coalition with other less reform-minded parties. Much will depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Says a pro-EU think-tanker: “The battle between the oligarchical system and the reformers is not over.”
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