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China is using an “anaconda strategy” to squeeze Taiwan

China is using an “anaconda strategy” to squeeze Taiwan


China’s dislike of Taiwan’s president Lai Ching-te is no secret. Chinese authorities call him a stubborn, confrontational “separatist” who may provoke war in the Taiwan Strait. But since Mr Lai’s election in May, it is China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that has been raising the chances of conflict by deploying more air and naval craft around Taiwan. “The PLA is using an ‘anaconda strategy’ to squeeze the island,” says Admiral Tang Hua, Taiwan’s navy commander.

In an interview with The Economist, Admiral Tang (pictured) warns that Chinese forces are “slowly, but surely” increasing their presence around his country. “They are ready to blockade Taiwan at any time they want,” he says. His concerns are backed up by the data. The number of PLA air incursions across the median line, the de facto border in the middle of the Taiwan Strait, has jumped more than five-fold, from 36 in January to 193 in August. The number of PLA ships operating around Taiwan has steadily risen, too, doubling from 142 in January to 282 in August. These vessels are also coming closer to Taiwan—right along its contiguous zone, or 24 nautical miles from its coast. And they are patrolling for a few days at a time, up from a few hours previously, according to Taiwan’s naval commander.

These are relatively new developments. Until August 2022 the PLA had operated mostly in Taiwan’s south and west, around the Bashi Channel between the island and the Philippines. Taiwan’s rugged east coast, home to aircraft hangars built underneath its mountains, was seen as safer and harder to reach from China. But that changed after a visit to the island that year by Nancy Pelosi, then a high-ranking American official. The trip enraged China and, soon after, the PLA conducted a mock blockade near Taiwan’s east. That sent a signal that the region was no longer safe. Now the PLA has normalised patrols there and regularly encircles the island by sea and air. It has also increased the number of navy transits through the Yonaguni channel between Taiwan and Japan.

Few people in Taiwan are aware of how close and regular the PLA patrols are. Since 2020 Taiwan’s defence ministry has published daily updates on air activity around the island, including maps of Chinese warplanes’ locations. In 2022 it added updates on the number of PLA naval vessels operating “around Taiwan”. But it does not specify what types of ships, where they go, or for how long. The government may be worried that too much disclosure would damage Taiwan’s public morale or economy, says Admiral Tang.

The PLA’s increased patrols are straining Taiwan’s navy. China has twice as many frigates and ten times as many destroyers. Taiwan often has to deploy 25-50% of its combat vessels just to match China’s patrols, according to Cheng-kun Ma and Tristan Tan, a pair of Taiwanese defence researchers. “They give you extreme pressure, pressure, pressure. They’re trying to exhaust you,” says Admiral Tang. A government audit found that more than half of Taiwan’s main warships had fallen behind on regular maintenance.

As the PLA Navy presses closer to the island, Taiwan is focused on avoiding confrontation. “The PLA is trying to force Taiwan to make mistakes,” says Admiral Tang, and looking for “excuses” to trigger a blockade. That is why Taiwan’s military leaders issued new rules of engagement this year that define ethical and legal use of force in self-defence: “We restrain our guys, not to provoke or escalate.”

Even as Taiwan’s armed forces practise restraint its leaders are working with allies on how to keep sea lines of communication open in case of a blockade. Taiwan is also seeking international help to resist Chinese pressure. Japan’s navy conducted a transit exercise through the Taiwan Strait for the first time in September, as did naval ships from Australia, New Zealand and Germany. America’s navy sails through it several times a year. The exercises send a signal to China that the strait is international territory. The Chinese authorities protest. But they show no sign of loosening the anaconda’s squeeze.

© 2024, The Economist Newspaper Ltd. All rights reserved. From The Economist, published under licence. The original content can be found on www.economist.com

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